















Department of Economics 
Tufts University 
Medford, MA 02155 
(617) 627 – 3560 
http://ase.tufts.edu/econ hudp¯nl.tex: February 28, 1999
INCOME MIXING AND HOUSING IN U.S. CITIES:
EVIDENCE FROM NEIGHBORHOOD CLUSTERS OF THE AMERICAN
HOUSING SURVEY 1





Most American households live in neighborhoods where the degree of income mixing (and
segregation by income) is determined by the housing market without public intervention. The
paucity of locational information in micro data sets which have samples representative of the U.S.
population has limited our understanding of the extent of market-driven mixing or segregation by
income in neighborhoods smaller than census tracts. This paper describes the extent of sorting
and mixing by income in the immediate neighborhoods surrounding U.S. urban households in
1985 and 1993, using a unique data set describing the characteristics of the closest neighbors of a
representative sample of U.S. urban households.
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Mixed-income housing has been a recurring theme of Federal housing policies and strategies. The
1937 Housing Act, Section 8, created a Federal program \ ... for the purpose of promoting eco-
nomically mixed housing." More recently, the landmark Mount Laurel ruling 2 established that a
municipality \cannot foreclose persons of low and moderate income from housing and must a±r-
matively a®ord that opportunity."
The interest in mixed-income housing has been grounded in the belief that aiding the dispersion
of poor households and undoing the heavy concentration of low-income households in dense urban
housing developments is socially bene¯cial. The belief rests on two premises: ¯rst, that greater
mixing will directly improve living conditions for the poor; second, that it can help break a vicious
circle of persistent poverty that feeds antisocial behavior and is more likely to arise where many
poor households are concentrated together (and isolated from the rest of the population).
The policy community has increasingly emphasized °exible policy interventions, programs that
subsidize households rather than structures. Both HUD and Congress have taken the view that
policies that result in heavy concentrations of very low income households in densely built urban
areas such as urban public (and particularly project-based) housing are to be avoided. Unlike the
urban renewal interventions of the 1950's and 1960's, current policies set out to use federal resources
in ways that encourage mixing of households of di®erent incomes as well as races, in the hope that
the development of community ties among heterogeneous households will help break down social
and ethnic barriers and enrich the urban social environment.3 It is hoped that such policies will
bring about a reversal of \epidemic" forces of urban decay and hence set in motion a process of
neighborhood economic and social recovery 4.
Mixed-income housing thus seems to o®er direct and indirect bene¯ts (improving the living
conditions of the urban poor and neighborhood economic development), which are obviously de-
sirable outcomes of policy intervention. As yet little research has been available to inform housing
2Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A 2nd. 713 (NJ 1975) and 456 A 2nd.
390 (NJ 1983), quoted in de Bartolom¶ e and Rosenthal (1996a).
3See Bratt (1989), p. 336-338, for a discussion of how mixed-income housing may help remove \the stigma
associated with living in a `project'."
4The so-called \epidemic" theories of ghettos [Jencks and Mayer (1990); Crane (1991)] have recently been cited
by the popular press as explanations for the reduction in urban crime in certain cities; see Gladwell (1996).
2policy-makers as to the extent of income diversity or mixing that arises without deliberate public
intervention. That information would make it much easier to design and evaluate the outcomes of
government interventions aimed at improving income diversity in subsidized housing.
A baseline of information has been needed to guide those policies, in the form of detailed
description of the extent of income mixing in U.S. neighborhoods. This paper does just that. It
summarizes new evidence of the extent of income mixing which develops as a market outcome in
U.S. urban areas, at the scale of the immediate neighborhood of urban households. To do so it uses
a unique data set, the American Housing Survey's neighborhood clusters data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses conceptual issues that
are deemed as crucial in understanding socioeconomic characteristics in the pattern of households'
location in space. Section 3 describes the American Housing Survey clusters data set in more detail
and reviews the availability of variables, especially geographic detail and income variables, which
are used later on in the description of income mixing. Section 4 introduces alternative measures
of mixing. Section 5 presents our ¯ndings, starting with the evidence on income mixing, and then
going on to characterize neighborhoods conditional on speci¯c characteristics of kernels, including
comparisons between neighborhoods of subsidized and unsubsidized renters, and between families
with and without children. Section 6 brie°y sets our ¯ndings in the context of the existing literature
. Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual Issues in Spatial Socioeconomic Outcomes
Average housing standards { and more generally, housing standards for most of the population {
have increased substantially in the past four decades in the United States, and that increase is well
documented. Nevertheless, the housing conditions of low income households, and particularly of
low income renters and of the poorest households in the population, have lagged, and remain a
major concern of policy makers at all levels of government.
Segregation and mixing by race is a well known and widely discussed feature of the urban
landscape in the United States. Patterns of racial segregation and mixing have long been a concern
of scholars and policy makers alike. Income segregation has received much less attention until
recently, and is much less well understood, both theoretically and empirically [See Vandell (1995)
3and Ioannides (1996)]. There is growing concern both that segregation by income in U.S. urban
areas is growing and that the negative e®ects of segregation of the urban poor are both more
pervasive and more insidious than was previously suspected [see Galster and Killen (1985), Case
and Katz (1991) and Abramson, Tobin and VanderGoot (1985)]5.
The main source of both rental and owner-occupied housing services in the United States is the
housing market. The distribution of housing outcomes re°ects the distribution of income, but sev-
eral quali¯cations are in order. At high income levels housing consumption increases with income,
but less than proportionately to income. As a result, housing consumption is less unequally dis-
tributed than income. Housing markets are highly imperfect, moreover, and it would be overly facile
to attribute all the remaining misallocation and inequity in housing consumption to fundamental
inequities in the income distribution. Some at least of the misallocation and inequities we observe
in the housing sector can be attributed to market failures which are appropriately addressed by
policy interventions. To design feasible, cost-e®ective policy interventions, we need to understand
the operation of the market and to know what kind of mixing or sorting by income it produces.
Residential segregation or mixing (heterogeneity) by income is a spatial outcome of the opera-
tion of the housing market. At the same time, residential neighborhoods are widely recognized as
a source of one important type of market failure: externalities, both positive and negative [Galster
and Killen (1995)]. We know that income di®erences and similarities, within and between neigh-
borhoods, contribute signi¯cantly to neighborhood interactions and residents' outcomes. For low
income households in particular, housing market outcomes can magnify income inequality in both
static and dynamic ways. Mixing of income levels within neighborhoods has been found to be an
important (and positive) in°uence on the socioeconomic opportunities which are available to neigh-
borhood residents. Neighbors' characteristics a®ect the choices visible to and made by households,
and youths in particular, living in those neighborhoods.
Because the distribution of income within di®erent ethnic groups varies widely across groups,
income and race segregation are highly correlated [Massey and Denton (1993)]. Segregation by
income and race can magnify income inequality. Some of these e®ects can be seen as negative
externalities of segregation of the poor. The consequences of discrimination and segregation in
5Recent research with data from European countries appears to con¯rm recent patterns of urban settlement there
similar to those in the United States, with growing segregation by income [Huttman et al. (1991)].
4housing markets are exacerbated because housing outcomes directly a®ect access to jobs. Both
institutional factors such as restrictive zoning and discrimination in the market for housing, and
market forces [Vandell (1995)] can mean that good jobs are accessible only with high transportation
costs if at all (the so-called spatial mismatch of jobs).
The basic economics of spatial outcomes in urban areas may be outlined as follows. On the
demand side of the market, sorting or clustering re°ects the distribution among households of
incomes and endowments of wealth and skills. It also re°ects the distribution among households
of both preferences for space and other attributes of housing and preferences for amenities of
neighborhoods and communities more generally. A further complicating factor is introduced when
neighbors' characteristics themselves in°uence movers' perceptions of neighborhood amenities. On
the supply side of the market, spatial di®erences in the price of land contribute to the formation of
neighborhoods of housing unit types. Together these market forces are a powerful source of spatial
bias toward intra-neighborhood homogeneity.6
The dynamic consequences of spatial outcomes in the housing market are correspondingly im-
portant. In many U.S. metropolitan areas, the structure of local government and of housing markets
leads to the concentration of poorer households in poor communities that are unable to invest large
amounts of resources in the schooling of their residents. Furthermore, di®erent communities may
o®er very di®erent access to resources that a®ect the formation of human capital more generally.
Each of these dynamic consequences in turn may perpetuate and even intensify initial di®erences in
income and wealth among households. Over time, this may produce a worsening of the distribution
of income and of housing outcomes.
In the light of the static and dynamic consequences of spatial segregation and its importance
in public policy, it is perhaps surprising that the extent of income mixing within neighborhoods of
the metropolitan areas of the United States has until recently received so little attention, and that
it is still relatively poorly understood, at a time when our understanding of the working of the U.S.
housing market has grown rapidly. The fact that so little is known about the extent of income mixing
in U.S. neighborhoods is largely attributable to a shortage of suitable data. Research on mixing and
segregation has been constrained by the limitations imposed by con¯dentiality on the use of survey
6Vandell [1995] provides a valuable and more extensive summary of economic models of residential location as
they a®ect spatial heterogeneity in urban areas.
5data. Location-speci¯c data can endanger the con¯dentiality of individual respondents' answers
to surveys. As a result, only very limited neighborhood-speci¯c or locational data are available
for the large household-level data sets (such as the Public User Micro Sample of the U.S. census
and the American Housing Survey), which are widely used by researchers and have improved our
understanding of housing markets.
Research on the socioeconomic and ethnic composition of urban areas has of necessity relied
on aggregate data collected within geographically de¯ned but much larger spatial units, such as
census tracts with an average population of 2500 to 7000 [White (1987)], Metropolitan Statistical
Areas, or states. Other studies use micro data (from the American Housing Survey, or the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, for example) which for reasons of con¯dentiality lack detailed locational
information beyond central city or suburban location within a known metropolitan area. Additional
understanding has been obtained from studies using local data [see Galster (1987)]. Both census
tracts and MSAs are too large to allow us to study many of the interactions which are most pertinent
to income mixing. Moreover, it is informative to be able to contrast ¯ndings based on the smallest
scale of neighborhood, with those obtained at a higher level of aggregation.
Income mixing and sorting (or clustering and segregation) can of course be viewed at many
scales. A relatively neglected aspect of income mixing in U.S. residential neighborhoods is the
neighborhood immediately surrounding a household { its closest neighbors. This is a scale which is
especially important to the designers and developers of planned mixed-income neighborhoods and
to policy makers who wish to in°uence such decisions.
The importance of this scale is highlighted by the work of Thomas Schelling [Schelling (1971;
1978))] who models the spatial outcomes which are possible where di®erent individuals di®er with
respect to their tolerance (or preference) for immediate neighbors who are similar to or who di®er
from them with respect to various characteristics. Schelling's theory describes how the details of
how people feel about interaction in their immediate neighborhoods can be responsible for key
features of large scale structures in space. Neighbor-to-neighbor interactions can have large-scale
consequences, because they can lead to chain reactions. One household moves for its own reasons,
but if its move tips some balance, it may cause others to move, too. As a result, a variety of
stable and unstable spatial outcomes are possible. Schelling's model provides valuable theoretical
6underpinnings for the intuitive insight and growing body of evidence that immediate proximity is
an important element of the social fabric of U.S. cities. To understand patterns of mixing at larger
scales, and to assess the feasibility and potential impact of deliberate policies aimed at income
mixing, we clearly need also to examine mixing at this much smaller scale.
3 The American Housing Survey Clusters Data
The present study examines empirical evidence of the extent of income mixing at the scale of the
immediate neighborhood. It draws on a recent feature of the American Housing Survey (AHS))7.
Studies using the AHS have largely de¯ned the basic framework for housing policy and research
in the United States.8. However, as we noted above, con¯dentiality severely limited the amount of
spatial data which could be released. As a result users could not, for example, compare households
or dwellings in the sample in the context of data about their neighborhood (census tract or even
town).
To provide more information on the social and physical environment of the units sampled, in
1985, 1989 and 1993, about one-hundredth of the dwelling units in the AHS national core urban
sample (680 in 1985 and more in subsequent years) were selected. Approximately ten of their
nearest neighbors were also interviewed. Con¯dentiality is not endangered because the location of
each cluster in its metropolitan area is not revealed. Nevertheless, this data set is uniquely valuable
because it provides an extraordinary view of clusters of immediate neighbors in U.S. metropolitan
areas. It constitutes a particularly suitable frame for assessing in micro detail the extent of income
mixing in U.S. urban areas. To date, only a small number of studies 9 have made use of the AHS
clusters data.
In this study we use data from the 1985 and 1993 clusters data. Each cluster is made up of the
randomly chosen member of the national AHS sample of urban dwelling units, the kernel, and the
ten homes closest to it, its neighbors [Hadden and Leger (1990), p. 1-51]. The clusters contain
7The AHS is a panel data set designed to represent dwellings in the United States; it is made up of a sample of
more than 50,000 dwelling units whose residents are interviewed every two years.
8Khadduri and Nelson (1992).
9See de Bartolom¶ e and Rosenthal (1995); Gabriel and Rosenthal (1995; 1996); Hoyt and Rosenthal (1995).;
Ioannides (1996) is the only paper we are aware of using the 1993 clusters data.
7fewer than ten observations for neighbors if some could not be interviewed.10
There is no unique scholarly or colloquial de¯nition of a neighborhood 11. In practice, the avail-
ability of data explains the widespread use of census tracts or towns as \statistical neighborhoods"
[White(1987)]. The information available from the clusters data about the income distribution of
the immediate neighbors of sampled dwellings is particularly valuable in understanding the extent
of market-driven income mixing in the United States, because it allows us to study a much ¯ner
grain of neighborhood than the census tract. However, it is important to realize the limitations
inherent in the design of the sample.
The kernels represent the entire population of American urban households; the clusters (neigh-
bors) represent the households living closest to them. The kernels are not a sample of neighborhood
centers, and the clusters data do not constitute a random sample of neighborhoods. Nevertheless,
the clusters are designed to represents the characteristics of the immediate neighbors (and neigh-
borhood in that sense) surrounding the kernels, and the clusters represent the entire population of
urban neighbors (or neighborhood in that sense). Because the cluster corresponds to the immediate
residential neighborhood of the kernel household, in this paper we use \neighborhood" to refer to
the place where the kernels and their neighbors live and \neighbors" to refer to the households sam-
pled in the clusters (not including the kernels). We know little about the location of each cluster12,
and nothing about the distance from the clusters to the center of the urban or metropolitan areas
where they are located, or about their proximity to the physical features (roads, parks, shopping
districts) which often de¯ne neighborhoods.
4 Measures of Income Mixing and Sorting in Neighborhoods
Measures of household income and income distribution always need careful interpretation: the same
household income represents a di®erent standard of living for a large household than it does for a
small one. When we are comparing households across di®erent urban areas, a further complexity
10Details of the sample structure and data availability are included in the Appendix.
11The theoretical literature certainly does not resolve the issue of how to de¯ne a neighborhood. Ellickson (1979) and
Goodman (1989) o®er theoretical insights, while Ioannides (1996) employs a Nash-equilibrium notion of neighborhood
interactions.
12The location of the urban clusters examined here is given by metropolitan area (or state for non-metropolitan
urban clusters) as metropolitan central city, metropolitan suburban or non-metropolitan urban.
8is introduced: the same household income has very di®erent purchasing power in a housing mar-
ket where prices are high than in one where they are relatively low. Median household incomes
(re°ecting earnings in the local job market) are a proxy, albeit imperfect, for relative cost of living
in di®erent metropolitan areas. In our tables we therefore group households by their household
income relative to the appropriate HUD adjusted area median family income (HAMFI). The HUD-
adjusted area median family income is based on the median family income for the metropolitan
area, adjusted for household size. HAMFI is a policy tool used to determine program eligibility for
many HUD programs and housing programs administered by other Federal agencies.13 Here we use
it to normalize incomes by household size and income relative to the urban area where the cluster
is located. 14
4.1 Income Categories
Data on income for households needed careful interpretation: the same household income may
represent a very di®erent standard of living for a large household than it does for a poor household.
In much of the analysis of income mixing in this report we have used household income standardized
for household size as well as relative to the appropriate level of HAMFI. To describe income levels
our starting point was the income categories used by HUD to de¯ne program eligibility cuto®s.
To give a detailed picture of income mixing in our tabulations and analysis we have speci¯ed
eight categories of incomes, de¯ning them again in terms of HAMFI. Each of those eight cate-
gories corresponds very roughly to a little more than a decile of the household income distribution.
The names and de¯nition of those categories are summarized in Figure 1 (which includes HUD's
categories for comparison).
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
4.2 How Much Mixing? The Benchmarks of Perfect Mixing and Perfect Sorting
The following section describes the patterns of mixing (or sorting) which we observe in U.S. neigh-
borhoods. Most of the measures of segregation used in the literature are designed to describe
13The de¯nition and use of the HUD-adjusted area median family income is described in more detail in HUD O±ce
of Policy Development and Research (1996), HUD (1996) for short.
14It also has the advantage that the extent of mixing for households in di®erent income groups can be compared
with their eligibility for current programs.
9situations where a particular area, say a city, is subdivided into smaller areal units, and the extent
of segregation is examined across the constituents of the area.15
To clarify the outcomes possible and one potential complicating feature of the distribution of
income, consider a hypothetical population which consists of two types of people, high-income
and low-income. Suppose that the economic system can allocate them into groups of equal size,
neighborhoods, in two alternative ways. In one, \perfect sorting" high-income people are completely
segregated from low-income people. The rich live in rich neighborhoods, and the poor in poor
neighborhoods. Each person is identical to all her neighbors. The numbers of rich and poor
neighborhoods will be in exact proportion to the numbers of high income and low income people
in the population. The second way of allocating people to neighborhoods is \perfect mixing" in
which the proportion of high- and of low-income people in each neighborhood is the same as in the
entire population.
A high degree of local within-neighborhood homogeneity (perfect sorting) is compatible with
varying degrees of metropolitan, regional or national heterogeneity, depending on the size of the
\sorted" neighborhoods. At the same time, widening income dispersion (however measured) within
a neighborhood may re°ect not a real increase in income mixing within the neighborhood, but
increased inequality of incomes in a metropolitan, regional or national context.
Caution is needed in interpreting the overall welfare signi¯cance of measures which show appar-
ent increased income mixing at the neighborhood scale, which may simply mirror widening income
inequality regionally and nationally.16 This is particularly relevant in our context, as an increase
in the inequality of family incomes and earnings has been observed and widely discussed in the
United States since 1973. Speci¯cally, the ratio of the 90th percentile family income to the 10th
percentile for the entire U.S. has increased from about 5.5 in 1973 to above 9 in 1994. Similarly
15This is done, for example, by the ¯ve dimensions proposed as measures of segregation by Massey and Denton
(1988). A measure of segregation or geographical dispersion may pertain to ¯rst, evenness, that is, how does the
percentage of poor within each neighborhood compare to the percentage of poor within the metropolitan area. Second,
exposure of one group to the other which re°ects the degree of potential contact between poor and nonpoor through
sharing neighborhoods in common. Exposure may be measured in two complementary ways, either through the extent
of interaction or isolation. Third, clustering describing the extent to which the poor and nonpoor occupy adjoining
areas, with maximum clustering taking the form of poor residential areas forming a large contiguous ghetto. Fourth,
centralization refers to poor households' location close to a metropolitan area center. And, ¯fth, concentration, a
measure of relative density in spatial patterns, which refers to the relative amount of space occupied by the two
groups.
16More generally, the notion of income mixing in relation to the overall income distribution is akin to the notion
of decreasing polarization [Esteban and Ray (1994)].
10pronounced changes have been measured for six of the nine U.S. regions de¯ned by the U.S. Bureau
of the Census [Bradbury (1996)].
Another indicator of the complexity inherent in attempting to measure mixing or segregation
is the recent evidence of widening income segregation in urban areas at a time when we observe a
slight narrowing of racial segregation and an increase in income inequality. Mayer (1996) compares
the central city concentration of families in each income quintile to the central city concentration of
the average family using Current Population Survey (CPS) data for MSAs from 1964 to 1994. He
shows that the ratio of the central city percentage of families in the bottom quintile to the central
city percentage of all families exhibits an upward trend and the respective ratio for the top quintile
exhibits an downward trend. Our own calculations 17 with published data from the same original
data source, the March CPS, ¯nd increasing asymmetry in the distribution of family income which
suggests increasing income inequality within the central cities of large metropolitan areas in the
United States, those with population exceeding 1,000,000 inhabitants.
Here, however, we seek to draw conclusions about the pattern of segregation along several
dimensions from a random sample of households in the United States and a cluster of up to ten of
their close neighbors. As statistical descriptions of characteristics of neighborhood clusters we have
used readily available statistical concepts. It was sometimes necessary to modify them in order to
describe variables of interest for entire clusters.
To measure the extent of mixing or sorting, within and between neighborhoods, we examine
sample means and coe±cients of variation (CV from now on) 18 for variables of interest, including
household income, age of the household head, education of the household head, and numbers of
children present. The sample mean and CV are calculated for kernel households.19 We can then
17Ioannides (1996) reports the ratio of mean to median income of families in central cities and compares it to those
outside central cities of large metropolitan areas, ¯nding changes which are more pronounced in central cities than
outside central cities:
Year 1971 1978 1981 1985 1989 1992
Central Cities 1.149 1.19 1.189 1.242 1.265 1.312
Outside Central Cities 1.121 1.128 1.124 1.147 1.183 1.163
Entire U.S. 1.126 1.139 1.154 1.188 1.213 1.208
18The coe±cient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean.
19We computed the coe±cient of variation of income for each neighborhood in which ¯ve or more households
reported income.
11compare this measure of dispersion for the entire population of urban households with the mean
CV for neighbors (a measure of the average amount of dispersion within neighborhoods) and the
CV of the CV for neighbors (a measure of the variability between neighborhoods in the amount
of dispersion). These measures are estimated for 1985 and 1993 (giving us indications of possible
changes in mixing over time). Using these measures we can compare the amount of dispersion within
and between neighborhoods for particular subsets of kernels, such as unsubsidized and subsidized
renters; we also compare dispersion by region and type of place.
We examine measures of mixing conditional upon kernels' characteristics, as well as their de-
cisions. We measure the average number of neighbors with a particular characteristic, and then
compare the overall mean with means for subsets of kernels. For example, consider the percentage
of owners among the neighbors in a cluster. How might it vary with the kernel's own character-
istics? Does the percentage of owners among a kernel's neighbors depend on whether the kernel
is an owner or a renter? On whether she is a subsidized or unsubsidized renter? On whether she
is white or nonwhite? Similarly we can ask about the mean age and level of education of neigh-
bors for kernels of di®erent type, or about the proportion of neighbors who are white or nonwhite.
These descriptive statistics are useful in understanding the microstructure of U.S. neighborhoods.
However simple, they have never been measured before at such a level of disaggregation. They
are motivated by Schelling's theory of residential segregation and will be referred to as Schelling
Statistics.
To provide a benchmark, we can consider three hypothetical cases. The ¯rst is the \perfect
sorting" described above. When all households are \perfectly sorted", each kernel is living in
a neighborhood with neighbors identical with the kernel and with each other. The CV for each
neighborhood would then be zero (since the standard deviation is zero); the mean CV for neighbors
would be zero, and the CV of the CV for neighbors would also be zero. In the second case,
\perfect mixing" as described above, proportions of household types in each neighborhood precisely
replicate the entire population. Then the CV within each neighborhood (and the mean CV for
neighborhoods) would be the same as the CV for the population, and the CV of the CV for
neighbors would be zero (since all neighborhoods have an identical mix of household types). The
third case is a mix of the ¯rst two: there are two types of neighborhoods, half of them sorted and
12half mixed. The CV for half the neighborhoods would be zero and for half it would be the same as
for the population. The mean CV for neighborhoods would be less than the population CV (since
not all neighborhoods are mixed) and the CV of the CV for neighborhoods would be positive (since
neighborhoods di®er).
Using this approach, we can examine the e®ect on mixing of the presence or absence of house-
holds with speci¯c characteristics, and restrict attention to the neighborhoods of kernels with
particular physical and/or economic characteristics. We can ask, for example, whether the neigh-
borhoods of owner-occupier households are more or less heterogeneous than the neighborhoods of
unsubsidized renters. Section 5.2 below uses the CV to measure the dispersion in income distribu-
tion within and between neighborhoods and Section 5.3 uses means and CV's to analyze the extent
of mixing in the neighborhoods of kernels with speci¯ed socioeconomic and dwelling characteristics.
In sections 5.2 and 5.4 below, we use quantiles of the distribution of incomes to describe both
kernels and their neighbors. We use this approach to describe the likelihood of income mixing, the
probability that kernels at each income level will live in di®erent types of neighborhoods. Neigh-
borhoods are characterized in terms of the income distribution of the neighbors who make up the
cluster. To describe both kernels and neighbors we again use HAMFI based measures, this time
characterizing them in terms of quantiles.
One way to describe a neighborhood is in terms of the median income of its residents (or any
other quantile of their incomes). Here we ¯rst characterize the overall distribution of income in
U.S. neighborhoods. We then look at access to these neighborhoods for kernels of di®erent types.
For example, we can ask what is the probability that a low income kernel will be living in a low,
middle, or upper income neighborhood. We can ask \What is the probability that the low income
kernel will have neighbors who have slightly or substantially higher incomes?" We then use a more
limited subset of measures (usually the median for a neighborhood) to look at the probability that
households with a wider variety of speci¯ed characteristics will live in neighborhoods with neighbors
with high or low median incomes.
135 Evidence of Income-Mixing in the Immediate Neighborhood of
U.S. Households
Households are not, of course, distributed randomly in an urban area. Households' tastes for housing
space, quality and amenities combine with their incomes and assets to de¯ne their demands for
housing of di®erent types in di®erent locations. Those tastes may include preferences for segregation
by income or race. Housing choices are further a®ected by a large number of spatially di®erentiated
factors including the location and accessibility of jobs, and the availability and quality of public
and privately provided amenities such as schools, libraries, churches and recreation sites.
Two theoretical models have profoundly in°uenced economists' thinking about income mixing
in U.S. cities. The Tiebout theory [Tiebout (1956)], which implies that households sort themselves
into communities of people with similar tastes and incomes, has been widely adopted to explain
the relative homogeneity of U.S. suburban communities. Households choose locations which o®er
the best available match to their preference and ability to pay (via local taxes) for locally produced
public services, particularly public education. A second in°uential theoretical proposition has been
the Alonso-Mills-Muth model, with its key prediction that otherwise identical individuals who di®er
only in terms of income will occupy successive (concentric) zones in a monocentric city.20 This will
produce income segregation related to distance from the Central Business District of the city: the
higher the household's income the further away from the center it will locate. Both the Tiebout
and the Alonso-Muth-Mills theories in their pure form are highly stylized models of inherently
complex phenomena. Both contribute to explaining the formation of patterns of income mixing
(or segregation). More important, neither theory explains the complex residential patterns which
we observe within the typical metropolitan area in the United States. In what follows, we use the
clusters data to describe that complexity.
5.1 The Tables
Our analysis culminates in a number of tables, which are given at the end of the main body of the
paper. The ¯rst two tables, Tables 1 and 2, use our data to describe two important dimensions of
the income distribution when income distribution is measured relative to HAMFI. Table 1 compares
20See Muth (1969) for a basic exposition.
14the income distribution across the four main U.S. regions, i.e., Midwest, Northeast, South and West;
Table 2 compares across central cities, suburban and urban nonmetropolitan areas. Tables 3 and 4
provide a detailed analysis on how mixing with respect to income and other characteristics changes
when we condition on the characteristics of the kernels. Tables 5 and 6 report alternative measures
of income mixing for kernels in each category of the income distribution. Table 6, in particular,
compares the neighborhoods of subsidized from unsubsidized renters. Table 7 provides detail on
income mixing in neighborhoods with multi unit structures.21
Since most of our statistical inference is based on a sample,22 it is appropriate to ask how
representative it is. We are prevented from obtaining weighted statistics (weights are available for
kernels but not for the neighbors). In particular, our data are consistent with the percentiles of the
distribution of household income relative to HAMFI.23
5.2 Income Distribution
This section describes the distribution of incomes within neighborhoods. One summary measure of
neighborhood income is the median income of the cluster in which the kernel lives. Neighborhood
median incomes are more tightly distributed (as we would expect if there is any mixing at all) than
household incomes.
Comparing the distributions of household (kernel) incomes and neighborhood medians we see
some evidence that extremely low and very low income households may be becoming relatively
21Additional and more detailed tables are given in the Appendix. Table A.1 provides details on the availability
of AHS clusters data, available by Standard Metropolitan Area (SMA). That table also includes data on the HUD-
Adjusted Area Median Family Income (HAMFI) for each SMA. Table A.2 gives some basic descriptive statistics for
the clusters dataset and compares them with national data. It summarizes data on households and the neighborhoods
in which they reside, as made possible by the clusters data, and on dwellings. The data from the entire national
sample reported in the bottom of that table allows us to conclude that even though the subsample of the national
sample that we are working with is rather small, the overall di®erences are rather minor. Table A.3 o®ers additional
comparisons between the AHS and national data. Tables A.5{7 in the Appendix o®er additional detail along these
dimensions.
22One which is roughly one-tenth of the national AHS sample and is made up of one hundredth of the national
sample plus their ten nearest neighbors.
23The descriptive statistics given in Table A.3 in the Appendix show that several key features are consistent with
published U.S. data, based on the national AHS sample. In addition, we compare our own computations, reported
in Table A.3, with frequencies obtained from the entire national sample of the AHS [HUD (1996), p. B-3]. In
1993, according to HUD's de¯nitions, 15 percent of households have extremely low incomes, (17 percent in our own
calculations). Similarly, 28 percent (30 percent) of households have very low incomes,; 45 percent (48 percent) have
low incomes, ; 22 percent (21 percent) of households have middle incomes,; and 33 percent (31 percent) of households
have upper incomes,. Our unweighted computations are very close to those based on the full AHS sample, although
they tend to overestimate the lowest income category and underestimate the highest ones.
15more isolated, while other neighborhoods become more mixed. In 1985, 29 percent of households
had median incomes in the extremely low or very low range (less than 50 percent of HAMFI). The
neighborhood median fell in that range in 25 percent of all neighborhoods. The corresponding
¯gure for neighborhoods and households in 1993 were 30 percent of households and 29 percent of
neighborhoods. The proportion of neighborhoods with median incomes in the very low income
range (at least half the residents had extremely low or very low incomes) is evidence of a growing
number of relatively homogeneous low income neighborhoods. At the other extreme of the income
distribution, 33 percent of households in 1985 and 31 percent in 1993 had incomes in the upper
income range (120% of HAMFI or more). The neighborhood median fell in that range in 20 percent
of neighborhoods in 1985 and 16 percent in 1993 (Figure 2). The apparent decline in the proportion
of neighborhoods with medians in the upper income range may re°ect entry of new households or
changes in the income of long-term residents.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
In seeking to identify changes between 1985 and 1993, we need to keep in mind two forces
which will be re°ected in both household and neighborhood median incomes: ¯rst, population
movements within and between regions (faster population growth in the West, for example) and
second, the widening of the national income distribution.24 The ratio of mean to median income
has increased from 1.231 to 1.326, for the entire United States (our own computations of 1.279
and 1.327 respectively are clearly very close.) The fact that the ratio of mean to median is almost
identical in our data to the U.S. ¯gures implies that the same widening of the income distribution
which occurred for the U.S. as a whole is (not surprisingly) re°ected in the distribution of income
for metropolitan areas.
Movement within regions and metropolitan areas probably accounts for some of the changing
pattern of dispersion. Table 2 shows di®erences in the distribution of household incomes, depending
on whether the dwelling unit lies in a central city, in a nonmetropolitan urban area, and in a suburb
of a central city.25 Comparing the three columns of Table 2, we can con¯rm that in both 1985 and
24Table A.3 shows the distribution of income in the sample for the four main Census regions, together with
supplementary information from the U.S. Statistical Abstract which highlights the phenomenon of widening in the
income distribution between 1985 and 1993. Table A.4 shows the distribution of income in the sample for three types
of urban neighborhood: metropolitan central city, metropolitan suburban and nonmetropolitan urban.
25In constructing this table we aggregated the basic categories as follows. Central city corresponds to METRO=1;
suburb includes METRO=2 (urbanized suburb), METRO=3, (other urban suburb); urban nonmetropolitan area
161993 central city neighborhoods have higher concentrations of low income households and suburbs
have higher concentrations of high income households.
The second reason for caution in interpreting the changes in the distribution of neighborhood
medians shown in Table A.3 is that comparisons based on HAMFI convey a slightly di®erent picture
from comparisons based on income alone, primarily because of the nature of the measure we are
using. Because HAMFI is designed to adjusts for household size, subtle changes in demographics
and population growth along regional dimensions are bound to a®ect the regional averages. More-
over, of course, HAMFI is established using median family income, but ours is sample is a sample
of households and not families.
In examining changes in the dispersion of household income for 1985 and 1993 (Table 3), caution
is needed. The median household income is signi¯cantly lower than the U.S. median family income.
As a result, the relationship of household income to the area median income(HAMFI), is quite
di®erent from the relationship of U.S. mean household income to U.S. median income. U.S. median
household income was $23618 in 1985 (76.6 percent of $30845, the average value for HAMFI in
that same year). In 1993, U.S. median household income was $31241, (75.5 percent of $41365, the
average value of HAMFI in our sample for that year). 26
Similarly, it follows from the de¯nition of HAMFI and the adjustments embodied in it, that
HAMFI does not (and should not be expected to) correspond to the true median for our sample
of households. In 1993, 52 percent of households in our entire sample have income above 80% of
HAMFI, and only 40 percent have incomes greater than HAMFI. As a result, caution is needed in
making comparisons across time of incomes de¯ned relative to HAMFI.
The design of HAMFI as an equivalence scale is particularly useful in comparison across regions,
as in Table 1, and by type of urban area, as in Table 2, within the same year. The Midwest and
the North East exhibit less concentration in the lower part of the distribution, relative to the entire
urban U.S., while the opposite is true for the South and to some extent for the West as well.
The same broad picture is preserved in 1993. The greater dispersion of the income distribution is
includes METRO=5, 6, 7 (urbanized area, nonmetropolitan other urban).
26Comparison of countercumulative distributions for household income relative to HAMFI also indicate an unmis-
takable shift, from 1985 to 1993, from the upper to the lower part of the distribution, for entire sample as well as
for each of the principal Census regions. The countercumulative distribution functions for household income as a
percentage of HAMFI for 1993 lie entirely below those for 1985. This means that the percentage of households whose
relative income is greater than any particular value is greater in 1985 than in 1993.
17re°ected in the greater maximum reported household income, although we note that one measure
of dispersion, the CV for kernels, fell slightly between 1985 and 1993. 27
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The CV for each neighborhood measures dispersion in the income distribution within the neigh-
borhood. Figure 3 shows the range of values and quartiles of the distribution of neighborhood CV's:
they ranged from 7.5 to 192.7 in 1985. The change between 1985 and 1993 in the distribution is
interesting: in 1993 there are fewer neighborhoods with very large CV (and a smaller maximum)
but the CV for the great majority of neighborhoods increased between 1985 and 1993. This is
evidence of an increase in mixing or diversity in a wide range of neighborhoods. That increase is
particularly striking when we compare it with the decline in the CV for kernels between 1985 and
1993.
The medians and coe±cients of variation are summary measures of income distribution within
and between neighborhoods. It is also useful, however, to look at how the income distribution
within neighborhoods varies for di®erent types of kernel. To interpret the results from the sample,
we consider ¯rst the two extremes (\perfect mixing" and \perfect sorting") which we used as
benchmarks in the previous section. If all households lived in neighborhoods characterized by
\perfect mixing" then the distribution of income within each neighborhood would replicate the
distribution in the whole population. Figure 4 shows the distribution of income of neighbors for
all kernels in a world of \perfect mixing". In all clusters, the neighborhood minimum income falls
in the low income range (as it does in the urban population). In all clusters, the neighborhood
median income is in the middle income range (again as in the urban population as a whole) and in
all clusters the maximum income is in the upper income range (as in the population.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Compare that distribution with the outcome with \perfect sorting". Each neighborhood has
residents who are identical to each other. In that case (see Figure 5) using the 1985 population pro-
portions as a starting point, 29 percent of clusters would have low income residents (corresponding
to the proportion of the population with low incomes); 38 percent of clusters would have residents
with middle incomes and 33 percent of the clusters would have residents with high incomes. Within
27The distribution of income for kernels ranges from a minimum of a reported income of $0 to a maximum of
$210,000 in 1985 and $300,000 in 1993.
18each cluster, the minimum, median and maximum income would all fall in the same range of in-
comes { a cluster with low income residents in a perfectly sorted world, for example, would have
its minimum, median and maximum income in the low income range.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
We can now use the two hypothetical extremes to compare with the actual distribution of
incomes for all clusters in 1985 (Figure 6). It falls between the two extreme benchmarks. Most
neighborhoods (84.1 percent of clusters) have at least one resident with a low income. With
'perfect mixing' we would expect that ¯gure to be 100 percent; with 'perfect sorting' it would
be 29 percent.28 Upper income households are not as widely dispersed, but 72.5 percent of all
neighborhoods have at least one resident in the upper income group (with \perfect sorting" it
would be 33 percent). The more detailed information in Figure 2 is consistent with this ¯nding,
but suggests that the atypical neighborhood residents may not be numerous: neighborhood median
income is in the middle income range de¯ned in our hypothetical examples (50-120 percent of
HAMFI) in 55 percent of neighborhoods, compared with the 38 percent we would expect with
perfect sorting and the 100 percent expected with perfect mixing.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
To investigate how the neighborhoods of the poorest urban households compare with U.S.
neighborhoods as a whole, we calculated the distribution of income of neighbors in 1985, restricting
our sample to kernels with extremely low incomes (Figure 7) and with very low incomes (Figure 8).
Because of sample sizes, those results should be interpreted with caution. Those distributions also
suggest that while some extremely low income and very low income households live in neighborhoods
where moderately low income and middle income households are present, a small proportion of
neighborhoods are occupied exclusively by the poorest households. In 14 percent of neighborhoods
of extremely poor kernels, the maximum income of neighbors was in the extremely low income or
very low income category. In 59 percent of neighborhoods of extremely poor kernels, neighborhood
median income was in the very low income or extremely low income category. Another 36 percent of
extremely poor kernels lived in neighborhoods with median incomes in the moderately low or middle
income categories (predominantly the former). The pattern for kernels with very low incomes is
28In Table 6 this is shown as the percentage of clusters the income range of the neighborhood minimum income:
in 84.1 percent of neighborhoods it falls in the low income range.
19similar (Figure 8). Almost half (47 percent) of them live in neighborhoods with median incomes in
the extremely low or very low income categories, but 56 percent have at least one neighbor in the
upper income category. However, 11 percent live in neighborhoods of the very poor: those where
the highest income is in the very low or extremely low income category.
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
5.3 Mean Characteristics of Neighborhoods Conditional on Speci¯c Character-
istics of Kernel Households
The neighborhoods sampled are at di®erent points in their dynamic evolution. Our empirical ap-
proach sets out to capture the essential feature of combined spatial and dynamic interdependence
in neighborhoods. This subsection presents the Schelling Statistics, which measure the interdepen-
dence of kernels and their neighbors' characteristics, ¯rst for the entire population sampled and
then for groups of particular interest.
5.3.1 Schelling Statistics: The Population
Our ¯rst set of the Schelling Statistics (conditional means and CV's) for key socioeconomic variables
is given in Table 3: the variables are household income, percentage of whites, percentage of owners,
age and education of head of household (reference person, according to the Codebook [Hadden
and Leger (1990)]) and number of children in the household. The table compares features of the
distributions of those variables across the sample of kernels for 1985 and 1993. Comparing the
means gives an indication of important changes between 1985 and 1993. Mean household income
for this sample increases from 1985 to 1993 though the increase is smaller than the corresponding
increase in the Consumer Price Index (Urban). As a result, mean real household income decreases
by 8.12 percent. The dispersion (measured by the CV) of kernels' household income registers a
small decrease. There is a substantial decrease in the percentage of whites, from 72.7 percent to
65.4 percent, a much smaller decrease in the percentage of owner-occupants, from 61.2 percent to
59.9 percent, a slight increase in the average number of children, from .676 to .702, practically no
change in average age, and an improvement of educational attainment of household heads, which
20goes up 12.4 to 12.9 years of schooling.
We obtain a ¯rst measure of the extent of mixing by computing the coe±cient of variation within
each neighborhood (represented by a cluster). The measures we use correspond to the benchmarks
associated with the extremes of \perfect mixing" and \perfect sorting" which were discussed in
section 4.2. To summarize, an increase in the mean of the CV for neighbors implied an increase in
diversity within neighborhoods; an increase in the CV of the CV for neighbors implied an increase
in between-neighborhood diversity.
We see that the mean (across all neighborhoods) CV of income for neighbors (within each
neighborhood) decreases by 2.2 percent. The CV of the CV for neighbors (our measure of dispersion
of the neighborhood CV's across all neighborhoods) decreases by 6.9 percent. These ¯ndings suggest
that from 1985 to 1993 income mixing decreases both within and across urban neighborhoods in
the United States. By comparing columns 2 and 3 we conclude that neighborhoods are in the
average more homogeneous than the set of kernels with respect to household income, likelihood
of owning and age of household head both in 1985 and 1993. This is also true for education
attainment in 1993. Neighborhoods have become more homogeneous across the U.S. (as indicated
by the dispersion across all neighborhoods of the neighborhood CV) with respect to income, age and
presence of children. Interestingly, neighborhoods have become substantially more heterogeneous
with respect to education (details are given in columns 4 and 8 of Table 3).
By looking at conditional statistics we can see how the characteristics of neighborhoods vary.
Table 4 reports our second set of Schelling statistics, \conditional Schelling statistics", for the
neighborhoods of kernels who have speci¯c characteristics. These characteristics are: renters, own-
ers, whites, nonwhites, subsidized and unsubsidized renters, subsidized and unsubsidized owners,
renters and owners with children of any age, nonwhites and whites with children of any age, renters
and owners with children with ages more than 10 and less than 18 years, and nonwhites and whites
with children with ages more than 10 and less than 18 years.
The design of our data lends itself uniquely to this computation, which is critical for under-
standing key aspects of the microstructure of U.S. residential neighborhoods as they pertain to
mixing in a variety of dimensions. The design of our data allows us in fact to condition precisely
on characteristics of kernels, which is appropriate given that it is the kernels that are randomly
21chosen from among the national AHS sample.
We report in Table 4 Schelling Statistics for the same variables which were included in Table 3,
and for additional variables: percentage of neighbors who are subsidized, percentage of neighbors
who have very low or extremely low incomes, percentage of upper middle or high income neighbors,
and percentage of neighbors who live in multi unit structures, de¯ned as structures with more than
four dwelling units. For ease of comparison, with the corresponding means and proportions in the
population as a whole, we report in the column labeled \All kernels," the corresponding statistics
for the kernels. We distinguish a number of categories, such as renters versus owners, and we
subdivide renters further into subsidized versus unsubsidized renters, and those categories in turn
into nonwhite and white household heads. We also look at households with white and nonwhite
household heads without distinguishing mode of tenure. For ease of comparison the top portion of
Table 4 refers to 1985 and the bottom to 1993.
5.3.2 Schelling Statistics: Tenure
Owner kernels live in neighborhoods which are more homogeneous with respect to mode of tenure.
Renters have fewer neighbors who are also renters than owners do neighbors who are also owners.
The typical renter has as neighbors more nonwhites(a mean of 34.1 percent) and neighbors with
younger household heads (average age 45.9 years), than the typical owner (17.1 percent and 50.2
years, respectively).
5.3.3 Schelling Statistics: Race
There are noteworthy changes between 1985 and 1993 in the characteristics of subsidized renter
households headed by nonwhites. For such households, the proportion of neighbors which are
households headed by whites more than doubles, from 8.3 percent to 16.0 percent; the proportion
of neighbors which are owners rises from 6.8 percent to 1.3 percent, and the mean education of
their neighbors rises, from 9.7 to 10.8 years. Among nonwhite renters, unsubsidized households have
fewer neighbors which are households with white heads (34 percent) than subsidized households (41
percent). A similar picture is suggested by the characteristics of subsidized owner and subsidized
owner households headed by nonwhites.
22Racial segregation is visible at the smallest neighborhood scale. Tables 3 and 4, but especially
the latter, give a hitherto unavailable glimpse at segregation down at the neighborhood level. In
1985, 82.4 percent of the neighbors of white household heads were whites, while only 37.9 percent
of the neighbors of nonwhite household heads are whites. There appears to be a slight reduction in
this measure of racial segregation between 1985 and 1993: the corresponding ¯gures for 1993 are
81.4 percent and 37.3 percent. By comparing households with nonwhite and white heads who rent,
we note that households headed by whites have ten times more neighbors who are also whites than
do nonwhites, 81 percent versus 8.3 percent.
5.3.4 Schelling Statistics: Subsidized and Unsubsidized Renters and Owners
Neighbors of subsidized renters exhibit considerably smaller mean incomes but a greater degree of
income mixing (measured in terms of the CV) than those of unsubsidized renters. Income mixing,
according the CV-based measure that we are using, increases among neighbors of subsidized renters
from 1985 to 1993, but decreases among neighbors of unsubsidized renters. Interestingly, from 1985
to 1993, income mixing goes up among neighbors of nonwhite subsidized and unsubsidized renters,
but goes down among neighbors of white subsidized and unsubsidized renters. Additional insight
into income mixing is o®ered in subsection 5.4, where we discuss income mixing by conditioning
upon characteristics of neighborhoods.
Subsidized households as a group have much lower incomes than unsubsidized ones in both 1985
and 1993. In 1985, in particular, the mean incomes for subsidized and unsubsidized households
respectively are $7075 and $31035. Subsidized renters are 43 percent nonwhite, and nonwhites in
both the subsidized and unsubsidized groups have even lower incomes, $5140 and $27832 respec-
tively. The neighborhood median incomes are correspondingly low for subsidized renter and owner
kernels. More than 80 percent of the neighbors of both subsidized renters and subsidized owners
have very low or extremely low incomes. Fewer than 5 percent of their neighbors have incomes
above HAMFI. The percentage of owners among neighbors of subsidized renters is small: 6.8 per-
cent for nonwhites and 8 percent for whites, in 1985, and 1.3 percent and 8 percent, respectively in
1993. Subsidized renters live primarily in multi unit structures, more than two-thirds of them in
structures with more than 4 units and about one-third in structures of more than twenty units in
23both 1985 and 1993. Subsidized renters have primarily other subsidized renters as their immediate
neighbors: 86.4 percent in 1985 and 77.5 percent in 1993.
In contrast, unsubsidized renters have few subsidized renters as neighbors: 3.9 percent in 1985
and 5.5 percent in 1993. About a fourth of their neighbors are owners. They live primarily in
structures with fewer dwelling units than subsidized renters: in 1985 and 1993, respectively, 26
percent and 33 percent of them live single-dwelling unit structures, and 44.8 percent and 39.5
percent in structures with more than 4 units.
Turning now to a comparison of income mixing and other neighborhood characteristics for
neighbors of subsidized with those of unsubsidized owners reveals some interesting features (the
sample of subsidized owners is so small that the results must be interpreted as suggestive rather
than de¯nitive). In general, the neighbors of unsubsidized owners are quite similar regardless of
whether those kernels have nonwhite or white household heads, with the exception of the racial
makeup of their neighborhoods. If the subsidized owner kernel is white, the proportion of neighbors
who are white is 96 percent; if the kernels are nonwhite, 78 percent of their neighbors are white.
The neighborhood income gap between neighbors of white and nonwhite kernels almost disappears
from 1985 to 1993, from $35543 for white subsidized owners and $29628 for nonwhites, it becomes
$44188 for white subsidized owners and $43400 for nonwhites.
5.3.5 Schelling Statistics: Households with Children
A key feature of the social fabric of neighborhoods is the presence of children. Children's interactions
are a powerful determinant of the character to urban neighborhoods, and the presence of children in
particular age groups may be a crucial factor in understanding the \epidemic" nature of antisocial
activities. It is thus of particular interest to consider both income mixing and the socioeconomic
structure of neighborhoods when children are present.
The neighbors of kernels with older children between 10 and 18 years old do not di®er substan-
tially from neighbors of all kernels with children. Table 4 details comparisons across neighborhoods
whose kernels have children of any age and, alternatively, kernels with older children. Gener-
ally, neighbors of households with children are less likely to live in multi unit structures, which
of course makes sense in view of the higher demand for space by households with children. It
24appears to be also true that neighbors of households with no children do not di®er dramatically
from those with children. The most noteworthy di®erences we found were between the neighbors of
nonwhite-headed households with older children (aged 10 to 18 year) and neighbors of all nonwhite
households. Income mixing (as measured by the CV), presence of white neighbors, and presence
of owner neighbors are greater among the former than the latter, and some changes have taken
place between 1985 and 1993. In particular, income mixing has increased but the presence of white
neighbors has decreased. Income mixing has also increased among neighbors of nonwhites generally,
as well, but so has the presence of white neighbors. This conclusion is corroborated by examining
changes in the percentages of neighbors in various income categories relative to HAMFI who have
incomes in the same category as themselves.
5.4 Likelihood of Income Mixing
Another way to understand income mixing in neighborhoods is to compare the probability that
kernel households will live in neighborhoods with neighbors whose incomes are similar to, or di®erent
from theirs. This section thus analyzes the clusters data using an extension of the hypothetical
models of \perfect mixing" and \perfect sorting" introduced in Section 4 of this paper.
Tables 5{6 (and Tables A.4{7 in the Appendix) are designed to highlight the extent of income
mixing within U.S. neighborhoods. They provide a more detailed look at the patterns of mixing
which were ¯rst introduced above in Section 5.2 These tables share the following format: in the
left margin, categories of income are de¯ned relative to HAMFI; the entries in di®erent columns
across the same row report of probabilities of various events (describing the income distribution
within neighborhoods) for kernels with incomes in the range de¯ning the row.29 Tables A.6 and
A.7 summarize these ¯ndings by means of full conditional distributions, as we see below in more
detail.
Table 5 describes income mixing by showing the probability that a kernel household in each
income category will live in a neighborhood with speci¯ed neighborhood income measures. The
29Analytically speaking, these tables report Schelling statistics, too. Unlike Table 4, which reports means for
neighbors conditional on certain characteristics of the kernels, these tables report Schelling statistics which are prob-
abilities. They are probabilities of events de¯ned in terms of the neighborhood income distribution and conditional
upon the kernel's position in the income distribution. The probabilities in the columns do not sum to one because
the event de¯ned in the columns of most of these tables are not mutually exclusive.
25¯rst column of data reproduces the ¯rst column of Tables 1 and 2 and shows the distribution of
all kernel households by income category, corresponding to the probability that a kernel will be in
each of those categories. We can now examine some characteristics of the distribution of income in
the neighborhoods where the kernels live. In Column 2 we compare the probability that a kernel in
di®erent income groups will live in a neighborhood with an extremely low median income. Whereas
in Figures 7 and 8 we were focussing on kernels with extremely low and very low incomes, and
asking about the probability that they would live in neighborhoods with income measures in each
category, here we are focussing on neighborhoods with speci¯ed characteristics (here a neighborhood
median income of less than 30% of HAMFI) and asking, \What is the probability that a kernel in
each successive income category (the rows) will live in such a neighborhood?"
We then examine the percentage of kernels in each income group who live in neighborhoods with
an extremely low neighborhood median income (Column 2). The third column shows the percentage
of kernels in each income category who live in neighborhoods with a neighborhood median income
in the extremely high category (over 200% of HAMFI). We see that a few (6 percent) of the very
high and even fewer (3 percent) of the extremely high income kernels live in the extremely low
income neighborhoods. Even fewer of the very poor (1 percent) and none of the extremely poor
live in the highest income neighborhoods.
By comparing with Figure 2, we see that extremely low income neighborhoods are some 13
percent of all neighborhoods, while the highest income neighborhoods are rare indeed (only 4
percent of all neighborhoods in 1985). When we look at neighborhoods where there is some mixing,
we see that very low or extremely low income households are not uncommon in all but the highest
income neighborhoods. The probability that a kernel will live in a neighborhood with more than
one low income neighbor (the bottom quartile of the neighborhood income distribution is in the
low income category) ranges from 81 or 82 percent (for kernels with extremely low or very low
incomes) to 26 percent (for extremely high income kernels). 30
A look at the likelihood of having several upper income neighbors (living in a neighborhood
where the top quartile lies in the upper income range) reinforces the conclusion that the highest
30For more details, see the fourth column of Table 5, which shows the probability that kernels will live in neighbor-
hoods where there is more than one neighbor (the lowest quartile of residents in a neighborhood of 10 households)
with very low or extremely low incomes.
26income households live apart: 79 percent of extremely high income kernels live in neighborhoods in
which three fourths or more of their neighbors have upper incomes. However, a non-trivial fraction
of low income households live in neighborhoods of this type (that is, with several neighbors whose
incomes are in the upper income range). It shows that the probability that a household (kernel)
will live in a neighborhood where the top quartile of the neighborhood income distribution lies in
the upper income category (120% of HAMFI or more) ranges from 79 percent for extremely high
income kernels to 15 percent (for very low income kernels) and 17 percent (for very low income
kernels).
This table shows some evidence of change between 1985 and 1993, but interpreting those changes
is daunting in the light of the concurrent changes in the income distribution as a whole. Does the
decrease in the proportion of extremely high income kernels living in extremely high and high
income neighborhoods (a decrease from 26 percent to 16 percent for neighborhoods with extremely
high median incomes; a decrease from 79 percent to 73 percent for neighborhoods with a third
quartile in the upper income category) indicate less mixing, or is it a statistical artifact? Similarly,
does the small decrease in the proportion of extremely low and very low income kernels living
in extremely low income neighborhoods imply more mixing? How do we explain the concurrent
increase in the probability that extremely low income kernels will live in high income neighborhoods
(an increase from 17 percent to 21 percent? We discussed above and emphasize here the problems
associated with drawing conclusions about changes over time using measures de¯ned in terms of
HAMFI.
One measure of income mixing for low income households is access to neighborhoods where one
half or three fourths of the neighbors have middle or upper incomes. In Table 6 we look at the
probability that kernels in each income category will live in such neighborhoods. We then look
separately at (and can compare) the probabilities for two subsets of kernels, subsidized renters and
unsubsidized renters in each income category. We look ¯rst (column 1) at neighborhoods where at
least 25 percent of households are in the middle or upper income groups (80 percent of HAMFI or
more). A kernel household with an extremely low income has a 33 percent probability of living in
such a neighborhood, compared with the 95 percent probability of living in such a neighborhood
for a kernel household with an extremely high income. The same extremely low income households
27have a 20 percent probability of living in a neighborhood where half the households have middle or
upper incomes. Virtually all those kernels with extremely low incomes who live in middle or upper
income neighborhoods are either unsubsidized renters or owners. In 1985, none were subsidized
renters.
Another indicator of the extent of mixing is the probability that a low income kernel household
will live near neighbors with incomes higher than its own.31 That is a®ected by the type of urban
area a kernel lives in. The probability that a kernel household with income in each category will live
in a middle or upper income neighborhood is di®erent for central city residents, suburban residents
and residents of urban (nonmetropolitan) areas. Extremely or very low income kernel households
are more likely to live in a middle or upper income neighborhood if they live in a suburb of a
metropolitan area (a probability of 25 percent for extremely poor kernels and 22 percent for very
poor kernels); the probability is only about half as much for extremely low income and very low
income kernels in central city neighborhoods (14 percent and 12 percent respectively). At the other
tail of the income distribution for kernels, extremely high income households are more likely to live
in a middle or upper income neighborhood if they live in a suburb (a probability of 86 percent) than
if they live in a central city (64 percent) or urban nonmetropolitan neighborhoods (67 percent).
We know that single family housing is highly segregated from large multifamily structures in the
U.S. housing stock. We can therefore ask how the size of the structure where a subsidized tenant
lives a®ects the income of the neighborhood. The U.S. housing stock varies considerably by region,
however. We compared relative incomes in the neighborhoods where subsidized renters live (by
region), ¯nding that dwelling type makes a di®erence. Subsidized renters in single family dwellings
tend to live in neighborhoods with higher median incomes than subsidized renters in structures
with more units. The poorest neighborhoods (those ranked lowest in terms of neighborhood median
income relative to cluster HAMFI) are those where the subsidized renters live either in 2- to 4-unit
structures, or in structures with 20 or more units. The small numbers of observations for subsidized
kernels make analysis at this level of disaggregation both unstable and unreliable, but the ¯ndings
shown in this table suggest that structure size is a dimension which warrants further exploration.
For example, are subsidized tenants in 2- to 4-unit structures more likely to be renting from resident
31Details of this analysis are given in Table A.5.
28landlords, and tenants in larger structures more likely to be in publicly owned or institutionally
managed structures?
We can also compare the probability of living in a neighborhood with signi¯cant numbers of
upper income households for di®erent types of tenure and di®erent types of structure: unsub-
sidized and subsidized renters, unsubsidized owners, and residents of single-unit and multi-unit
structures.32 Examining mixing in this kind of detail, we see that at each income level, kernel
households who live in single family structures, and owner-occupier kernels, are more likely to
live in upper income neighborhoods. The only exception is upper income renters in multifamily
structures, who are no less likely to live in upper income neighborhoods than kernels with similar
incomes in single family structures.
Finally, we can examine in more detail two aspects of the pattern of mixing: First, the joint
distribution of kernel incomes and their neighborhood median incomes, and second, the full set of
measures of the underlying neighborhood income distribution. Looking ¯rst at the joint distribution
of kernel incomes and neighborhood median incomes, for example, we can compare the probability
the probability that a kernel household will live in a neighborhood where their income is close to the
neighborhood median, by looking at the diagonal entries in a table where the same categories are
used for kernel incomes and neighborhood median income.33 The likelihood that a kernel household
lives in a very poor or extremely poor neighborhood is, not surprisingly, strongly in°uenced by the
income of the kernel household. The kernels most likely to live in neighborhoods with medians
close to theirs are the richest, followed by the poorest households (Table A.6). In 1985 kernels who
have extremely low incomes (16 percent of all kernels) have a 42.7 percent probability of living
in a neighborhood where the median income of its neighbors is also extremely low. The same
kernel households have only an 18.3 percent probability of living in a neighborhood with median
income in the middle or upper income range. At the other end of the income distribution, kernels
with extremely high incomes (12 percent of all kernels) have a 64 percent probability of living in a
neighborhood where the median income of their neighbors is extremely high.
In contrast, middle income households are much less likely to live in a neighborhood with a
median income similar to theirs. The 16 percent of households with moderately low incomes (50%
32Table A.4 provides detail.
33Details are given in Table A.6.
29to 80% of HAMFI) have only a 20 percent probability of living in a neighborhoods with a median
income in the same range. Similarly the 13 percent of kernels with lower middle incomes (80% to
100% of HAMFI) have a 20.8 percent probability of living in a neighborhood with a median income
in the same range as their own. Again caution is needed in interpreting results, not least because
our quantiles based on HAMFI are not of equal sizes.
A comparison of the tables for 1985 and 1993 suggests that higher income neighborhoods may
be becoming more accessible to the poorest households, and that the highest income households
are slightly less likely to live in exclusively high income neighborhoods, but this conclusion is
tempered by our previous caveats and the observation that the categories for both households and
neighborhoods are de¯ned in terms of HAMFI, and that the ratio of HAMFI to median and mean
incomes is higher in 1993 than in 1985.
Turning to the more detailed analysis of distribution of neighborhood incomes, Table A.7 shows
the probability that income distribution measures for a neighborhood will fall in each quantile,
de¯ned in terms of HAMFI. Incomes are dispersed in most U.S. neighborhoods, in the sense that
the extremes of the income distribution are represented in the majority of neighborhoods. In 1985,
the minimum income (that is, the income of the poorest household) falls in the extremely low range
(0 to 30% of HAMFI) in 66.1 percent of all neighborhoods. The highest income households are
also widely dispersed: in the same year, the income of the richest neighbor is extremely high (over
200% of HAMFI) in 36.5 percent of neighborhoods, and there is at least one very high or extremely
high income neighbor in 58.5 percent of all neighborhoods. The same table also shows some
neighborhoods which look more like \perfect sorting": neighborhoods made up of concentrations
of households all of whom have very similar incomes. We see such neighborhoods at both extremes
of the income distribution. In 12.1 percent of neighborhoods, three fourths of all households have
extremely low or very low incomes. In 4.9 percent of neighborhoods, the richest household has a
very low or extremely low income. At the other extreme of the income distribution, 10.8 percent
of neighborhoods have a very high or extremely high median income. In a very few (3 percent) of
neighborhoods in our sample, segregation is so great that only the poorest 25 percent (the bottom
quartile of the income distribution) have incomes below the very high income range. In all but a
few of those high income neighborhoods, we ¯nd some low income households. In 96 percent of all
30neighborhoods at least one household has a low, very low or extremely low income. Rather than
interpret this as unambiguous evidence of mixing, however, we should note that some at least of
the low income households in higher income neighborhoods have higher permanent incomes, but
their current in comes may re°ect either short term °uctuations in income (for household heads
recently downsized or laid o®) or are living on accumulated assets (retirees or rentiers).
6 Comparison with Evidence of Income Mixing in Large Scale
Urban Neighborhoods
Communities display degrees of both homogeneity and heterogeneity in many dimensions and at
many scales. We know that even where there is mixing by race in a large geographical area, there
may still be segregation at the local (immediate neighborhood) level [Massey and Denton (1993)].
Massey and Hajnal (1955) show how a long-term trend away from macro-level and towards micro-
level segregation has helped segregation patterns to evolve to minimize, in particular, white contact
with blacks. As we have noted, however, we know much less about both static and dynamic patterns
of segregation by income. The micro level of detail provided by the AHS clusters allows us to gauge
the extent of such segregation or mixing, by race or by income level at a much smaller scale.
Most of what we know about the extent of segregation or mixing in U.S. cities (and much more is
known about U.S. cities than about urban areas in any other country) has been based on aggregate
data on neighborhoods de¯ned by census tracts. In contrast, the neighborhoods considered here are
de¯ned as the ten neighbor households closest to the kernel. This is a neighborhood de¯ned with a
very small grain, at the level of the building or street. Whereas census tract \neighborhoods" cor-
respond more closely to the notion of a school district, the neighborhood clusters \neighborhoods"
correspond to the households who are seen and with whom households interact daily, on stairs, in
elevators, at the mailbox or in the street or playground.
As Galster and Killen point out \there is no single geographic scale over which the metropoli-
tan opportunity structure varies. On certain dimensions it may be relatively invariant across an
entire metropolitan area, varying only from one metropolitan area to the next. More likely, cer-
tain dimensions vary across municipal jurisdictions and others vary across census tracts within
31municipalities... . Still others may vary at even smaller scales. (p. 21)" This section makes some
comparisons between ¯ndings of the existing literature on income segregation and mixing and the
characteristics of neighborhoods as they are de¯ned by the AHS neighborhood clusters data set.
Empirical studies of mixing using aggregate data make extensive use of indices of segregation
and dissimilarity. These aggregate measures of the degree of segregation, mixing or concentration of
speci¯c groups in space are standard tools. The measures depend on the availability of observations
for all the spatial areas which make up the city or metropolitan area. The clusters in contrast sample
households and their neighbors, and represent only a tiny fraction of each metropolitan area. What
we can see from the clusters is how the characteristics of neighbors vary, conditional on the kernel's
characteristics.
Evidence of the relative extent of segregation by race and by income is mixed. One source of
variation is the de¯nitions of poverty and race which are used. Abramson, Tobin and VanderGoot
(1995) using the U.S. census de¯nition of poverty, conclude that in 1990 \compared with the segre-
gation of the poor, the segregation of blacks was much greater in the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan
areas in 1990 ... the dissimilarity for blacks was 60.6, compared with the 36.1 dissimilarity for the
poor..."(p. 51). The use of averages conceals wide variation between metropolitan areas: the same
authors found that the index of dissimilarity for the poor in the 100 largest metropolitan areas in
1990 ranged from 19.6 to 55.1. Studies using more narrowly de¯ned income classes have (not sur-
prisingly) found more segregation. Abramson et al. contrast their results with Massey and Eggers
estimate of a dissimilarity index of 47.0 for \poor" versus \a²uent" families in 60 metropolitan
areas in 1980 and \an average dissimilarity across the four income classes of 29.4." (p.53).
White (1987) found that the poor (de¯ned as households or individuals below the poverty
threshold) are signi¯cantly segregated - with a dissimilarity index of 36%, meaning that on average
about thirty six percent of poor families would have to move to be evenly distributed throughout
the SMSA. The corresponding measure of dissimilarity for race (black) was 67.6 percent ; for the
college educated it was 32.6 percent. Multi-family housing was almost as concentrated as race (an
index of 52.8 for multi-family housing and 43.3 for single family dwellings. Home ownership had an
index of 38.6. However, he also pointed out that poverty dissimilarity disaggregated by race was
much less than for the total population (29.2 on average for whites and 32.4 for blacks), implying
32that segregation by race and the correlation of race and income have confounding e®ects.
We can compare White's ranking of his index of dissimilarity, ranking variables by the degree
of dissimilarity which they display on average in his sample of cities. When we rank household
characteristics by the degree of dispersion exhibited by our neighborhoods (using the CV as the
measure of dispersion) we ¯nd a pattern comparable but not identical to that found by White, with
the exception of the number of children per household (which has a coe±cient of variation of 1.59
in 1985 and 1.56 in 1993) and (more surprisingly) education of the household head (which has a
coe±cient of variation of .294 in 1985 and .262 in 1993). In our data, race has a lower coe±cient
of variation (.62) than income (.87) or tenure (.80) in 1985, although the di®erence narrows from
1985 to 1993 when the corresponding values are income (.853) tenure (.789) and race (.731). Both
White and our data show much less dispersion in age between neighborhoods. In our data, as in
White's, housing types are very highly segregated, with a coe±cient of variation of.88 for single
family housing and 1.27 for multi- family structures with more than 5 units.
7 Conclusion
The neighborhoods sampled are at di®erent points in their dynamic evolution. Because the Amer-
ican Housing Survey neighborhood clusters data were collected for several periods, they can and
should be used to study the dynamics of mixing { the evolution of households' and dwellings' cir-
cumstances, conditional upon speci¯c characteristics of their neighborhoods { in much more detail.
Our empirical approach, conditioning upon neighbors' characteristics as well as their decisions, set
out to capture the essential features of spatial interaction in neighborhoods.
What our two snapshots of neighborhoods are not able to capture is the phenomenon of com-
bined spatial and dynamic interdependence. Individuals do care about their neighbors' characteris-
tics, and households' location decisions interact in extremely complex ways to produce the outcomes
of mixing and segregation which we observe. Just as households' incomes and their tastes a®ect
residential patterns, we also know that individuals' choices and their opportunity sets are a®ected
by the characteristics of their neighbors, or by changes in their immediate neighborhood. Resi-
dential choices are a®ected, as well as choices about education, employment, teenage pregnancy,
or drug use. Further research on the dynamics of mixing and segregation using these data will be
33invaluable.
Further research on the dynamics of segregation and mixing, however, will demand careful
de¯nition of quantiles of the distribution of incomes which are consistent over time. It is clearly
appropriate to take account of the impact of household size on the standard of living represented
by a given household income. With steadily declining household sizes, declines in household income
need to be interpreted with care. At the same time, it is imperative that we take account of changes
the price structure, while avoiding the distortions which are potentially introduced by any simple
measure of the e®ect of in°ation on real standards of living. The research presented here makes it
clear that variations in changes in the cost of living from city to city are signi¯cant, and that they
cannot be ignored in looking at the dynamics of housing markets. An obvious explanation is that
housing costs make up a substantial component in any cost of living index. But housing costs (and
their rate of change) probably vary more from city to city than any other component in the cost of
living.
Future work (perhaps using quintiles rather than quantiles de¯ned with respect to HAMFI)
would allow us to examine the dynamic impact of institutional and individual forces at work
in facilitating or reducing segregation, such as the presence or absence of households who are
recipients of housing subsidies, the age of household heads, the presence or absence of children.
Models of individual choice, for example, could be used to analyze the characteristics of movers out
(households who were present in 1985 and had moved before 1989 or 1993) and (more important)
of their neighborhoods. Similarly, using individual choice models, we could look at interactions
between neighborhood features and characteristics of movers in (households present in 1985 and
not in 1989 or 1993).
A provocative outcome of this study is that it identi¯es neighborhoods where the poor are
isolated - those where the third quartile or even the maximum neighborhood income falls in the
very low income or extremely low income categories. But it also suggests that households do not
care so much about their neighbors' incomes that they sort themselves out in a pattern remotely
resembling the "perfect sorting" model we used as a benchmark. We found one or more low
income households and one or more high income households in the great majority of the kernels'
neighborhoods.
34A next step is to explore further the dynamics of this pattern. How many of the neighborhood
outliers { households with very low or very high incomes in otherwise middle income neighborhoods,
for example { have incomes which are only temporarily di®erent from most of their neighborhoods.
Are the neighborhoods apparently \mixed" because some residents have experienced temporary
shocks which caused their income to be unusually high or low? Are the neighborhoods apparently
\mixed" because some households have unusually high (or low) tastes for housing, or for neighbor-
hood characteristics, and thus choose to live in neighborhoods where they spend much more (or
less) on housing than their neighbors? Are the neighborhoods mixed because moving is costly, and
therefore many, perhaps most households are not in equilibrium? In that case the neighborhood
\outliers" will be the ¯rst to move. Or have some \outliers" chosen to stay because they have
strong ties to their neighborhood. Each explanation has di®erent policy implications.
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39Figure 1
Income Categories Used in the Analysis
Income as Terms Corresponding 
% of  Used in this HUD - Defined Income 
HAMFI Study Category
Low income households: 48%
0-30% Extremely low income 17% Extremely low income    | |
Very low income |
30-50% Very low income 13%    | |
Low income
50-80% Moderately Low income 18% |
Middle income households: 21%
80-100% Lower middle income 12% |
Middle Income
100-120% Upper middle income 9% |
High income households: 31%
120-150% Moderately  High  income 10% |
Upper Income
150-200% Very high income 10% |
|
 200% - Extremely high income 11% |
Figures in italics are the proportion of kernel households in each category in 1993Figure 2
Incomes of Households and Median Incomes of Neighborhoods
1985 1993
Income as Household Neighborhood  Household            Neighborhood
% of Income: % Median income: Income: % Median Incom
HAMFI  of Households  % of Clusters  of Households  % of Clusters
0-30%  16 13 17 13
30-50%  13 12 13 16
50-80%  16 27 18 27
80-100%  13 18 12 16
100-120%    9 10  9 12
120-150%  10 11  10  9
150-200%  11  5 10  5
200% -  12  4 11  2
Total 100 100 100 100Figure 3
Measures of  Income Distribution and Dispersion:
Coefficients of Variation for Households and Neighborhoods
1985 1993
Household
Income $$  
(Kernels)




of Variation:  87.2 85.3
NeighborhoodMedian Income:
The distribution of Coefficients of Variation
Mean of
Nbhd CV 60.4 62.7
Minimum 7.5   7.6
Q1  46.1  48.7
Q2(Median)  58.2  60.3
Q3  71.2  73.7
Maximum 192.7 179.5Figure 4
Hypothetical Distribution of Incomes of Neighbors :
 "Perfect Mixing"
Income distribution of Neighbors for all kernels
If all neighborhoods were identical (all households live in neighborhoods with an income
distribution  identical to the population income distribution)
Measure Neighborhood Neighborhood  Neighborhood 
as % of Min Income:  Median Income: Max. Income:
HAMFI  % of Clusters  % of Clusters  % of Clusters
0-50% 100% 0 0
50-120%  0 100% 0
>120%  0 0 100%
Total 100 100 100Figure 5
Hypothetical  Distribution of Incomes of Neighbors:
 "Perfect Sorting" 
Note: Income distribution of the population is assumed to be that of the U.S. in 1985
Income distribution of Neighbors for all kernels if all households were perfectly sorted (all
residents of a neighborhood are identical to each other)
Income as Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood 
% of Min Income:  Median Income: Max. Income:
HAMFI  % of Clusters %of Clusters   % of Clusters
0-50% 29 29 29
50-120% 38 38 38
>120%  33 33 33
 Total 100 100 100Figure 6
Actual Distribution of Incomes of Neighbors: All Kernels 1985
Actual Income distribution of Neighbors
Measure Neighborhood Neighborhood  Neighborhood Neighborhood 
as % of Min Income:  Q1 Income: Q3 Income:  Max. Income:
HAMFI  % of Clusters  % of Clusters  %of Clusters   % of Clusters
0-50% 84.1 52.7 12.1 4.9
50-120% 14.2 40.1 45.5 22.7
120%- 1.6 7.0 42.4 72.5
Total 100 100 100 100Figure 7
 Distribution of Incomes of Neighbors:Extremely Low Income
Kernels 1985
Summary Distribution of Incomes of Neighbors: Extremely Low Income Kernels 1985
Income distribution of neighbors: 
For kernels with income <.3HAMFI in 1985 (N=82)
Income as Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood 
% of Min Income:  Median Income: Max. Income:
HAMFI  % of Clusters %of Clusters   % of Clusters
0-50% 96 59 14
50-120%    4 36 39
>120%    0  6 46
 Total 100 100 100
Detailed Distribution of Incomes of Neighbors: Extremely Low Income Kernels 1985
Income
as a Neighbors
% of Min Income:  Q1 Income: Median Q3 Income:  Max. Income:
HAMFI  % of Clusters
0-30% 89 69 39 22  7
30-50%  7 11 20 15  7
50-80%  4 16 27 30 12
80-100%  0  3  4  7 21
100-120%  0  0  5  9  6
120-150%  0  1  6 12 13
150-200%  0  0  0  3 17
200%  0  0  0  3 16
Total 100 100 100 100 100Figure 8
Distribution of Incomes of Neighbors: Very Low Income
Kernels 1985
 
Income distribution:  1985
For kernels with income between .3 HAMFI and .5 HAMFI in 1985 (N=73)
Summary Distribution of Incomes of Neighbors: Very Low Income Kernels 1985
Income as Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood 
% of Min Income:  Median Income: Max. Income:
HAMFI  % of Clusters %of Clusters   % of Clusters
0-50% 99 47 11
50-120%  1 45 33
>120%  0   8 56
 Total 100 100 100
Detailed Distribution of Incomes of Neighbors: Very Low Income Kernels 1985
Income as Neighbors 
% of Min Income:  Q1 Income: Median Q3 Income: Max. Income:
HAMFI  % of Clusters
0-30% 88 45 21 8  1
30-50% 11 37 26 15 10
50-80%  1 11 36 29 11
80-100%  0  5  8 21 11
100-120%  0   1  1 12 11
120-150%  0  0   5  8 18
150-200%  0  0   1  4 19
200%  0  0   1  3 19
Total 100 100 100 100Tables
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1985 and 1993
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borhoods
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48Table 1:
Income Distribution Relative to HUD-adjusted Median Family Income, by
Regions, 1985 and 1993
Sample: Kernels and Neighbors
Year 1985 1993
Regions All Mid North All Mid North
SMSAs West East South West SMSAs West East South West
Mean HAMFI ($) 30845 31001 34267 27608 32381 41365 41574 45954 37023 43425
0%{30% 16 17 19 15 14 17 18 18 16 16
30%{50% 12 13 12 12 12 13 15 12 13 15
50%{80% 16 18 16 15 17 18 19 17 17 16
80%{100% 13 14 14 10 13 12 12 13 11 14
100%{120% 9 10 9 9 10 9 9 8 9 8
120%{150% 11 9 10 12 11 10 11 10 9 10
150%{200% 11 10 11 12 11 10 9 10 11 10
200%{ 12 9 10 15 11 11 8 11 13 11
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
49Table 2:
Income Distribution Relative to HUD-adjusted Median Family Income, by
Central City, Nonmetro Area and Suburban Areas of Central Cities
Sample: Kernels and Neighbors
Year 1985 1993
Regions All Central Urban Suburban All Central Urban Suburban
SMSAs City Nonmetro SMSAs City Nonmetro
Observations 6215 2946 663 2606 9207 4126 976 4105
Total (%) 100 47 11 42 100 45 11 45
Mean HAMFI ($) 30845 29879 24197 32299 41365 40958 32862 42798
Distribution of Household Income as % of HAMFI
0%{30% 16 21 16 10 17 22 14 12
30%{50% 12 14 13 10 13 15 14 12
50%{80% 16 17 17 16 18 18 19 17
80%{100% 13 11 9 15 12 12 9 14
100%{120% 9 8 9 11 9 8 10 9
120%{150% 10 10 9 12 10 9 11 11
150%{200% 11 9 11 13 10 8 9 12
200%{ 12 10 15 13 11 9 14 12
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
50Table 3:
Mean Characteristics of Kernel Households and Neighborhoods
(\Schelling Statistics")
Column 1 reports means for the respective variables for kernel households, for 1985.
Column 2 reports the coe±cient of variation, de¯ned as sample standard deviation divided by
sample mean, among all kernel households.
Column 3 reports the mean of the neighborhood coe±cient of variation, to be referred to as neigh-
borhood CV, which is computed by associating with each kernel the coe±cient of variation of
respective variable among its neighbors and then by taking the mean over all kernels.
Column 4 reports across all neighborhoods the coe±cient of variation of the neighborhood CV,
which is computed by associating with each kernel the coe±cient of variation for the respective
variable among its neighbors and then taking the coe±cient of variation over all kernels.
Columns 5{8 repeat the same measures for 1993.
Year 1985 1993
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Statistic Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV
Sample Kernels Kernels Nei/hoods Nei/hoods Kernels Kernels Nei/hoods Nei/hoods
Observations 680 680 680 680 960 960 960 960
Income 29755 .872 .605 .361 36712 .853 .627 .336
White (=1) .727 .615 .619 1.15 .654 .728 .731 1.03
Owner (=1) .612 .797 .764 1.08 .599 .818 .789 1.06
Age (years) 49.1 .368 .306 .328 49.33 .358 .308 .307
Education (years) 12.4 .294 .306 .328 12.9 .262 .205 .585
Children .676 1.59 1.604 .422 .702 1.56 1.680 .403
51Table 4:
Mean Characteristics of Neighbors Conditional on Characteristics of Kernel
Households
(Conditional \Schelling Statistics")
Variables Kernels Neighbors of
Only Renter Owner White Nonwhite
Kernels Kernels Kernels Kernels
Year 1985 Characteristics of Neighbors
Income 29755 21917 34551 31157 22227
Inc (CV) .872 .960 .759 .825 .894
White (=1) .838 .774 .874 .94 .297
Owner (=1) .616 .228 .840 .639 .453
Age (yrs) 49.13 45.85 50.24 49.03 46.60
CV .368 .408 .328 .357 .361
Education (yrs) 12.39 11.98 12.86 12.71 11.41
CV .294 .308 .260 .266 .336
Children .68 .64 .73 .67 .88
CV 1.59 1.72 1.52 1.61 1.42
Subsidized (%) 5.2 13.2 0.6 3.7 14.5
% below 50 % HAMFI 27.2 43.3 19.2 25.0 45.5
% above 100% HAMFI 42.7 28.1 52.1 45.7 29.2
% in multiunit 20.5 47.9 3.8 17.5 33.4
Obs 581 2206 3591 4710 914
Year 1993 Characteristics of Neighbors
Income 36712 29090 43903 39802 30809
Inc (CV) .853 .918 .769 .814 .957
White (=1) .817 .753 .869 .930 .322
Owner (=1) .599 .261 .834 .642 .458
Age (years) 49.33 46.14 51.81 50.00 47.39
CV .358 .396 .325 .354 .360
Education (yrs) 12.95 12.60 13.25 13.13 12.39
CV .262 .271 .233 .242 .271
Children .70 .68 .65 .63 .85
CV 1.56 1.70 1.62 1.67 1.52
Subsidized 5.5 13.5 .8 3.7 15.7
% below 50 % HAMFI 30.3 43.0 20.9 26.3 43.8
% above 100% HAMFI 39.7 27.7 49.2 43.5 29.2
% in multiunit 20.1 44.8 4.6 17.7 31.2
Obs 812 3201 5084 6516 1380
52Table 4: Continued
(Conditional \Schelling Statistics")
Variables Subsidized Renters Unsubsidized Renters Subsidized Owners Unsubsidized Owners
NonWhites Whites NonWhites Whites NonWhites Whites NonWhites Whites
Year 1985 Characteristics of Neighbors
Income 7846 9200 17499 24724 42895 33226 29628 35543
Inc (CV) .983 1.102 .823 .872 .48 .71 .757 .758
White (=1) .0930 .807 .414 .919 .472 .92 .22 .96
Owner (=1) .698 .077 .198 .242 .962 .81 .799 .86
Age (yrs) 46.87 57.99 43.83 44.71 45.9 44.5 49.5 50.8
CV .370 .346 .399 .412 .291 .35 .32 .32
Education (yrs) 9.65 10.42 11.36 12.40 13.7 12.5 12.0 13.0
CV .327 .339 .325 .290 .213 .251 .343 .246
Children 1.42 .558 .776 .559 .943 .97 .784 .71
CV 1.08 1.88 1.54 1.81 1.03 1.18 1.50 1.54
Subsidized 86.0 75.0 3.9 2.0 0.0 1.4 1.7 2.003
% below 50 % HAMFI 88.4 84.0 52.9 32.8 1.9 16.4 28.2 17.9
% above 100% HAMFI 3.1 4.4 21.1 33.4 60.4 52.1 43.1 54.0
% in multiunit 65.1 70.7 52.6 42.6 0.0 2.1 5.5 2.8
Obs 129 181 384 1426 53 140 348 2952
Year 1993 Characteristics of Neighbors
Income 8647 16924 25624 33341 34603 45510 43401 44188
Inc (CV) 1.08 1.00 .931 .842 .77 .62 .78 .77
White (=1) .158 .838 .338 .904 .493 .96 .330 .947
Owner (=1) .005 .076 .228 .303 .841 .797 .804 .841
Age (years) 43.16 51.34 45.13 45.70 49.1 47.3 50.9 52.2
CV .410 .408 .389 .391 .32 .32 .31 .33
Education (yrs) 10.91 11.54 12.34 12.91 12.1 13.5 13.0 13.3
CV .271 .279 .267 .269 .229 .235 .267 .224
Children 1.26 .81 .82 .606 .65 .74 .78 .63
CV 1.16 1.67 1.55 1.77 1.91 1.36 1.61 1.62
Subsidized 87.4 60.0 7.3 3.0 1.4 0.5 1.6 0.8
% below 50 % HAMFI 88.4 68.5 48.7 34.7 31.9 13.5 25.4 20.0
% above 100% HAMFI 3.2 11.1 21.6 33.6 36.2 58.0 45.6 49.7
% in multiunit 74.7 71.5 43.1 39.5 2.9 0 5.9 4.4
Obs 190 235 536 2049 69 207 555 4005
53Table 4: Continued
(Conditional \Schelling Statistics")
Variables All Children All Children Children, 10-17 Children, 10-17
Renters Owners NonWhites Whites Renters Owners NonWhites Whites
Year 1985 Characteristics of Neighbors
Income 20359 37191 23158 33938 20609 36303 22974 33545
Inc (CV) .87 .734 .900 .787 .887 .734 .959 .763
White (=1) .67 .85 .28 .93 .66 .83 .30 .95
Owner (=1) .31 .86 .51 .72 .28 .85 .49 .70
Age (yrs) 44.1 48.8 45.9 47.6 42.4 48.5 45.2 46.7
CV .371 .320 .348 .337 .361 .313 .344 .332
Education (yrs) 11.2 12.94 11.4 12.6 10.9 12.7 11.1 12.5
CV .346 .256 .335 .277 .380 .259 .357 .287
Children 1.10 .89 1.13 .91 1.28 .97 1.30 1.00
CV 1.18 1.33 1.20 1.30 1.11 1.21 1.08 1.23
Subsidized 16.4 0.4 14.9 3.2 16.7 0.5 16.2 2.6
% below 50 % HAMFI 48.1 17.3 45.5 22.5 49.8 17.7 49.0 21.8
% above 100% HAMFI 24.4 54.9 29.8 48.9 24.6 53.1 25.1 49.6
% in multiunit 29.5 1.6 23.3 7.4 37.0 0.1 27.0 8.3
Obs 874 1726 580 2020 468 819 359 928
Year 1993 Characteristics of Neighbors
Income 28760 47121 32298 42576 28813 47612 30845 43233
Inc (CV) .953 .745 .944 .802 .987 .749 .972 .810
White (=1) .67 .84 .28 .92 .62 .83 .25 .91
Owner (=1) .30 .86 .54 .69 .28 .87 .49 .69
Age (years) 44.7 50.3 46.8 48.6 44.4 50.0 44.9 48.8
CV .378 .321 .352 .343 .380 .319 .357 .340
Education (yrs) 11.9 13.4 12.3 13.0 11.7 13.5 12.2 13.0
CV .291 .227 .263 .253 .310 .231 .264 .268
Children 1.09 .79 1.14 .93 1.31 .94 1.34 1.00
CV 1.23 1.39 1.26 1.27 1.12 1.25 1.11 1.23
Subsidized 16.2 0.9 16.6 3.7 22.2 1.2 24.8 4.5
% below 50 % HAMFI 47.7 17.8 42.8 25.0 49.4 18.0 47.4 24.9
% above 100% HAMFI 24.9 52.4 30.1 45.6 24.6 51.2 26.9 45.2
% in multiunit 31.5 1.5 19.1 10.9 33.9 0 24.9 9.7
Obs 1380 2309 834 2855 658 1021 405 1274
54Table 5:
Incomes of Kernels and The Neighborhoods They Live in
The kernel's income category is shown in the left margin. Successive rows of the table show
the probability that a kernel household that income category lives in a neighborhood with the
characteristics speci¯ed at the top of the columns. Di®erent columns specify di®erent neighborhood
characteristics (alternative ways of describing neighborhood income mixing). Column 2 gives the
probability that a kernel household in each income group will live in a neighborhood with extremely
low median income. Column 3 gives the probability that a kernel household in each income group
will live in a neighborhood with extremely high median income. Column 4 gives the same probability
for neighborhoods where the lowest quartile of neighbors have very low or extremely low incomes,
and Column 5 gives the same probability for neighborhoods where the top quartile of neighbors
have very high or extremely high incomes. Note: Numbers in the rows do not sum up to one (even
though they represent probabilities) because the categories (columns) are not mutually exclusive.
Year 1985 1993
Income as % All Probability All Probability
of HAMFI Kernels Q50 Q50 Q25 Q75 Kernels Q50 Q50 Q25 Q75
< :3H > 2H < :5H > 1:2H < :3H > 2H < :5H > 1:2H
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0{30% 16 39 0 81 17 17 37 1 85 21
30%{50% 12 21 1 82 15 13 18 1 75 29
50%{80% 16 13 2 63 31 17 13 1 66 30
80%{100% 13 5 1 43 51 13 7 0 63 40
100%{120% 9 8. 2 39 51 10 4 0 47 54
120%{150% 11 0 2 38 52 10 1 3 39 56
150%{200% 11 6 5 31 61 10 2 2 33 72
200%{ 12 3 26 26 79 10 3 15 31 73
55Table 6:
Incomes and Household Characteristics of Kernels in Middle and High Income
Neighborhoods
This table shows the probability that a kernel household with selected household or dwelling
structure characteristics will live in a middle or high income neighborhood (neighborhoods with
median neighborhood income of 80% or more of the HUD-Adjusted Median Family Income for the
metropolitan area).
The kernel's income category is shown in the left margin. Columns 1{5 report the probability
that a kernel household in each of those income categories in 1985 lives in a neighborhood with
the characteristic or characteristics speci¯ed at the top of the column; columns 6{10 repeat for
1993. Column 1 reports the probability that kernel households in each income category live in
neighborhoods in which at least the richest one-half of their neighbors had middle or high incomes.
In column 2 we consider neighborhoods in which households in the top quartile have incomes in the
middle or high income category. The probability that a household with extremely low income will
live in a neighborhood where the richest quarter of neighbors have middle or high incomes was 33
percent in 1985. Successive rows report the probability of the same event for kernel households with
very low income, low income, etc. Column 3 reports the probability that kernel households who
are unsubsidized renters in each income category live in neighborhoods in which at least the richest
one-half of their neighbors had middle or high incomes. Column 4 reports the probability that
kernels who are subsidized renters in each income category live in a neighborhood in which at least
50 percent of the neighbors had middle or high incomes (the median income of the neighborhood is
80% of HAMFI). Column 5 reports the probability that kernel households who are owners in each
income category live in neighborhoods in which at least the richest one-half of their neighbors had
middle or high incomes.
Note: Numbers in the rows do not sum up to one (even though they represent probabilities)
because the categories (columns) are not mutually exclusive.
56Year 1985 1993
Probability Probability
Income as % Q50 Q75 Q50 Q50 Q50 Q50 Q75 Q50 Q50 Q50
of HAMFI > :8H > :8H > :8H > :8H > :8H > :8H > :8H > :8H > :8H > :8H
Unsubs/d Subsidized Owners Unsubs/d Subsidized Owners
Renter Renter Renter Renter
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0{30% 15 33 20 0 22 18 39 13 5 37
30%{50% 18 48 14 0 22 28 57 18 4 36
50%{80% 36 68 18 0 55 27 63 19 0 33
80%{100% 60 84 31 . 75 49 75 34 0 59
100%{120% 56 84 18 0 65 58 81 46 . 64
120%{150% 70 88 43 . 77 70 91 42 0 80
150%{200% 77 89 61 . 83 70 93 41 . 79
200%{ 74 95 36 . 82 73 94 75 . 72
57Table 7:
Incomes in Neighborhoods of Multifamily Structures
Means are reported for a categorical variable de¯ned for neighborhoods with kernels who are
unsubsidized renters, as follows. For each neighborhood the categorical variable is assigned a
value of 1, 2, and 3, depending upon whether the ratio of median cluster income to cluster HAMFI
(calculated for the cluster-average household size) for the neighborhood belongs to the low, medium,
and upper one-third, respectively.
Year 1985 1985 1985 1985 1993 1993 1993 1993
Region Midwest Northeast South West Midwest Northeast South West
1 unit 2.00 2.00 1.94 1.89 1.76 2.18 1.84 1.93
2{4 units 1.27 1.81 1.60 1.00 1.55 1.63 1.20 1.40
5{19 units 1.67 1.50 1.79 1.83 1.80 1.86 1.30 1.67
more than 20 units 1.60 1.77 1.75 1.80 1.20 1.75 2.33 1.17
58Appendix
A number of highly detailed tables may be of interest to some readers and are thus given in
this Appendix. They are as follows:
Table A.1: Data Availability and HUD-Adjusted Area Median Family Income (HAMFI), by
Metropolitan Area.
Table A.2: American Housing Survey: Descriptive Statistics.
Table A.3: Comparison of Incomes between American Housing Survey and National Data by
Regions, 1985 and 1993.
Table A.4: Incomes and Household Characteristics of Kernels in Moderately High Income Neigh-
borhoods.
Table A.5: Probability of Living in Neighborhoods with Incomes above the Middle Level, by
Type of Urban Area.
Table A.6: Incomes of Kernels and Income Mixing in Their Neighborhoods.
Table A.7: Neighborhood Income Distribution Measures, All Kernels and Neighborhoods.
Table A.8: Kernels in Neighborhoods with Low Incomes (Median less than 80% HAMFI).
59Table A.1:
Data Availability and HUD-Adjusted Area Median Family Income (HAMFI),
by Metropolitan Area
Metropolitan area names are abbreviated by retaining the ¯rst word of their standard names.
HAMFI is as supplied by HUD. Data availability is reported on the basis of the authors' own
processing using the AHS data from the National Core and Supplement CD-ROM [US Bureau of
the Census (1996)]. Data for suppressed names are not reported.
Name of MSA 1985 1993
Clusters Observations HAMFI ($) Clusters Observations
Akron, OH . . 29902 1 10
Albany, NY 2 22 32661 3 28
Albuquerque, NM 2 20 28038 3 31
Allentown, PA 2 22 32065 2 22
Alton, IL . . 32587 . .
Anaheim, CA 10 94 42131 14 127
Appleton, WI . . 31617 1 9
Atlanta, GA 11 88 34675 11 103
Atlantic City, NJ . . 32363 . .
Augusta, GA-SC . . 27814 1 11
Austin, TX 1 9 31170 1 11
Bakers¯eld, CA . . 26099 . .
Baltimore, MD 7 58 35197 10 101
Baton Rouge, LA 1 11 27889 2 21
Beaumont, TX . . 26547 . .
Beaver, PA 1 8 24384 2 19
Bergen, NJ 2 18 43623 5 56
Birmingham, AL 4 41 25801 6 59
Boston, MA 8 78 38179 16 149
Boulder, CO 1 10 37657 1 11
Bridgeport, CT 3 30 37434 4 43
Canton, OH 1 10 27591 2 22
Charleston, SC . . 26397 . .
Chattanooga, TN-GA 1 9 24981 2 16
Chicago, IL 21 196 35495 29 248
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 2 18 31617 3 34
Cleveland, OH 5 54 31543 9 90
Colorado Springs, CO 1 11 29156 1 6
Columbia, SC . . 29828 1 11
Columbus, OH 1 10 31319 2 17
Corpus Christi, TX 1 6 24459 2 11
Dallas, TX 6 56 33929 11 102
Davenport, IL 4 34 28933 4 35
60Name of MSA 1985 1993
Clusters Observations HAMFI ($) Clusters Observations
Daytona Beach, FL 1 8 24682 1 19
Denver, CO 1 9 34600 1 15
Des Moines, IA . . 31841 . .
Detroit, MI 17 172 34968 25 242
Duluth, MN-WI 1 5 26099 1 5
East St Louis, IL . . 32587 . .
El Paso, TX 1 10 20656 4 38
Erie, PA . . 26621 . .
Eugene, OR . . 25279 1 11
Evansville, IN-KY . . 28485 . .
Flint, MI 1 11 31244 2 21
Fort Lauderdale, FL 2 17 30648 4 32
Fort Myers, FL . . 26919 . .
Fort Wayne, IN . . 31692 . .
Fort Worth, TX 4 37 32288 5 47
Fresno, CA 1 11 24608 2 12
Gary-Hammond, IN 1 11 31394 2 24
Grand Rapids, MI 2 20 32810 4 43
Greensboro, NC . . 29306 1 7
Greenville, SC 1 11 27665 1 11
Hartford, CT . . 36464 1 9
Honolulu, HI 1 10 37210 1 10
Houston, TX 10 84 31692 16 146
Indianapolis, IN 2 21 31916 2 15
Jackson, MS . . 25875 . .
Jacksonville, FL 2 20 28560 5 34
Jersey City, NJ 3 32 29231 5 50
Johnson City, TN-VA 2 22 22296 2 24
Kansas City, MO-KS 4 43 32214 8 71
Knoxville, TN 3 30 24981 4 37
Lake County, IL . . 35495 . .
Lakeland, FL 1 11 24160 1 8
Lancaster, PA . . 31319 . .
Lansing, MI 1 10 32885 1 3
Las Vegas, NV 2 22 30200 2 22
Lawrence, MA-NH . . 37891 . .
Lexington, KY . . 27665 1 10
Little Rock, AR 1 9 27143 2 11
Los Angeles, CA 33 317 32065 46 446
Madison, WI . . 35271 1 16
McAllen, TX 1 7 15138 1 5
61Name of MSA 1985 1993
Clusters Observations HAMFI ($) Clusters Observations
Melbourne, FL . . 29529 1 1
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 3 28 26323 5 46
Miami, FL 7 60 25950 13 101
Middlesex, 2 21 45711 3 31
Milwaukee, WI 1 10 33109 4 41
Minneapolis, MN 8 82 36986 12 116
Mobile, AL 4 35 23116 4 38
Modesto, CA . . 27069 . .
Monmouth, NJ 3 15 38627 4 26
Montogomery, AL . . 26248 1 8
Nashville, TN 1 12 29306 2 24
Nassau, NY 12 115 47053 12 125
New Haven, CT 2 22 37434 3 30
New Orleans, LA 2 15 25130 5 42
New York City, NY 30 260 32904 47 442
Newark, NJ 5 48 41759 9 92
Norfolk, VA 5 50 29907 6 60
Oakland, CA 9 82 39074 11 99
Oklahoma City, OK 4 39 27814 4 37
Omaha, NE-IA 1 11 30946 1 11
Orlando, FL 1 9 29828 5 48
Oxnard, CA 1 11 41162 2 19
Pensacola, FL 1 10 24981 1 10
Peoria, IL 1 10 30946 1 9
Philadelphia, PA 19 194 34749 24 237
Phoenix, AZ 5 53 31021 7 53
Pittsburgh, PA 5 30 27367 10 82
Providence, RI 1 10 30957 1 8
Raleigh, NC 2 19 34675 3 31
Riverside, CA 8 80 30648 9 89
Rochester, NY 3 29 33854 3 30
Rockford, IL . . 31766 . .
Sacramento, CA 4 30 31766 5 44
St Louis, MO-IL 5 46 32587 7 62
Salem, MA . . 38179 . .
Salinas, CA . . 29753 . .
Salt Lake City, UT 3 26 30275 4 40
San Antonio, TX 4 32 25726 5 47
San Diego, CA 6 62 32736 9 80
San Francisco, CA 8 70 40491 16 138
San Jose, CA 5 50 44219 8 81
62Name of MSA 1985 1993
Clusters Observations HAMFI ($) Clusters Observations
Santa Barbara, CA 1 11 33929 1 5
Santa Rosa, CA . . 34451 . .
Sarasota, FL . . 29455 . .
Scranton, PA 2 22 26025 2 19
Seattle, WA 3 28 35793 10 100
Shreveport, LA 3 32 24086 3 27
Spokane, WA 2 22 26099 2 22
Spring¯eld, MA 1 11 29455 1 11
Stamford, CT 1 6 37434 1 10
Stockton, CA . . 28485 . .
Syracuse, NY 2 18 30872 3 31
Tacoma, WA 2 19 28858 3 31
Tampa, FL 7 57 26025 7 57
Toledo, OH 3 27 30424 4 33
Trenton, NJ . . 40193 . .
Tucson, AZ 4 37 26621 5 62
Tulsa, OK 1 9 27963 2 24
Utica-Rome, NY 1 11 26248 1 9
Vallejo, CA 1 10 34898 2 19
Washington, DC 14 142 45189 22 205
Waterbury, CT . . 37434 2 16
West Palm Beach, FL 4 28 32139 5 39
Wichita, KS 1 11 30722 3 32
Worcester, MA 2 19 38179 2 24
Youngstown, OH 2 20 26621 4 37
63Table A.2:
American Housing Survey: Descriptive Statistics
Household data and dwelling units data are for units interviewed both in 1985 and 1993.
Mean Coe±cient of Variation
Cluster-Survey Data 1985 1993 1985 1993
Cluster-averaged data 662 984
Household income ($) 29407 36932 .577 .558
CPI-Urban (all) 107.6 144.5
Monthly rent ($) 348 490 .466 .455
Property value ($) 75986 104923 .616 .691
CPI-Urban (housing) 107.7 141.2
Household data 7322 7322
Date head moved in (19 - -) 74.9 81.5 .155 .153
Age of head (years) 48.46 49.64 .363 .355
Highest grade (years) 12.54 12.92 .441 .410
Race (% White) 71 67
Household size 2.62 2.56 .574 .580
Household income ($) 29433 37436 .846 .844
Dwelling unit data 7322 7322
Number of rooms 5.35 5.39 .353 .341
Unit area (ft
2) 1565.1 1559.7 .603 .564
Appreciation ratet;t¡1 (owners) .0601 .0264
Monthly rent (renters) 326.5 465.1 .519 .483
Property value ($, owners) 79800 110303 .679 .727
Publicly owned housing (PROJ=1) 3.1% 2.6%
National sample 43104 49326 43104 49326
Household income 28330 37693 .849 .849
Owner-occupant (%) 63.69 63.81 .755 .753
Age of head (years) 48.15 49.01 .365 .356
Highest grade (years) 12.38 12.87 .271 .244
Race (% White) 86.7 84.67 .391 .425
64Table A.3:
Comparison of Incomes between American Housing Survey and National Data
by Regions, 1985 and 1993
Sample: Kernels and Neighbors
U.S.- designated statistics are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States [U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1987; 1995)] and apply to the entire U.S. and regions, as appropriate, and
not just urban areas. U.S. median housing costs and property values also apply to the entire U.S.
and regions and are obtained from the AHS [U.S. Bureau of the Census (1985; 1993)]. All other
statistics are based on authors' own processing of the American Housing Survey data [U.S. Bureau
of the Census (1996)].
Year 1985 1993
Regions All Mid North All Mid North
SMSAs West East South West SMSAs West East South West
Summary Statistics
Mean Income ($) 29410 26658 31140 28934 30928 37490 34085 41001 35893 39470
CV Income .846 .818 .858 .859 .827 .854 .849 .850 .874 .819
Median Income ($) 23000 21700 24000 22145 24565 28248 26000 30075 26312 30336
U.S. Mean Income ($) 29066 28149 31146 27044 31475 41428 39442 45319 38249 45284
U.S. Median Income ($) 23618 23551 25485 21397 25782 31241 31400 33747 28441 33739
Mean HAMFI ($) 30845 31001 34267 27608 32381 41365 41574 45954 37023 43425
U.S. Median 357 330 388 322 427 487 424 551 445 579
Monthly Housing Costs ($)
U.S. Median 63211 45108 76224 47310 81913 86529 71898 116102 70376 134430
Property Values ($)
65Table A.4:
Incomes and Household Characteristics of Kernels in Moderately High Income
Neighborhoods
Table reports the probability that a kernel household with selected household and/or dwelling
structure characteristics will live in a moderately high income neighborhood (median neighborhood
income greater than 120% of HUD-Adjusted Median Family Income for the metropolitan area).
In the left margin, relative income categories are de¯ned in terms of kernel household income
as percentage of HUD-Adjusted Area Median Family Income. Columns 1 and 7 report percentiles
for each of those income categories for 1985 and 1993, respectively. Columns 2{6 and Columns
8{12 give the probabilities that a kernel household with speci¯ed characteristics and with income
in the respective category lives in a neighborhood with speci¯ed characteristics. Speci¯cally, The
¯rst row of Column 2 gives the probability that a kernel household with extremely low income (less
than 30% of HAMFI) who is a subsidized renter lives in a neighborhood where at least the richest
one-half of residents have incomes above 120% of HAMFI; successive rows report the probability of
such households with very low income (30%{50% of HAMFI), low income, etc. Column 3 gives the
probability that a kernel household who is unsubsidized renter and has extremely low income (less
than 30% of HAMFI), very low income (30%{50% of HAMFI), etc., lives in a neighborhood where
at least the richest one-half of residents have incomes above 120% of HAMFI. Column 4 gives the
probability that a kernel household who is an unsubsidized owner with extremely low income (less
than 30% of HAMFI), with very low income ((30%{50%) of HAMFI), etc., lives in a neighborhood
where at least the richest one-half of residents have incomes above 120% of HAMFI. Column 5
gives the probability that a kernel household lives in a single-unit structure with extremely low
income (less than 30% of HAMFI), with very low income ((30%{50%) of HAMFI), etc., and in a
neighborhood where at least the richest one-half of residents have incomes above 120% of HAMFI.
Column 6 gives the probability that a kernel household who lives in a structure with at least 20
units and has extremely low income (less than 30% of HAMFI), very low income (30%{50% of
HAMFI), etc., lives in a neighborhood where at least the richest one-half of residents have incomes
above 120% of HAMFI.
66Year 1985 1993
All Kernel Structure All Kernel Structure
Relative Sub/d Unsub/d Owner Single > 20 Sub/d Unsub/d Owner Single > 20
Income Renter Renter Fam. Units Renter Renter Fam. Units
% of HAMFI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0{30% 16 0 7 1 8 0 17 7 3 15 11 4
30%{50% 13 0 6 11 10 0 16 0 0 11 9 0.0
50%{80% 16 0 4 24 22 0 18 0 3 13 13 9
80%{100% 13 0 4 21 21 0 12 0 9 20 20 0.0
100%{120% 9 0 0 18 19 0 9 0 7 14 12 33
120%{150% 10 0 0 30 29 0 10 0 11 20 23 14
150%{200% 11 0 22 33 41 50 10 0 18 32 32 26
200%{ 12 0 18 60 57 68 11 0 38 50 51 33
67Table A.5:
Probability of Living in Neighborhoods with Incomes above the Middle Level,
by Type of Urban Area
For kernel households with incomes in each of the categories of the ¯rst column who live in
a particular type of urban area, the entries in the table give the probability that such a kernel
household lives in a neighborhood where one-half of incomes are above the middle level (median
neighborhood income greater than 80% of HAMFI).
Year 1985 1993
Kernel Income Central Urban Suburban Central Urban Suburban
as % of HAMFI City Nonmetro City Nonmetro
0{30% 14 0 25 15 0 28
30%{50% 12 29 22 22 22 36
50%{80% 22 54 46 25 13 32
80%{100% 41 60 68 26 50 67
100%{120% 47 60 65 53 64 60
120%{150% 62 57 80 75 55 70
150%{200% 74 71 79 66 70 73
200%{ 64 67 86 71 56 78
68Table A.6:
Incomes of Kernels and Income Mixing in Their Neighborhoods
This table gives the probability that a kernel household lives in a neighborhood with median
income belonging to respective HAMFI-based quantiles. For example, the probability that a kernel
household with income less than 30% of HAMFI lives in a neighborhood whose median income is
also less than 30% of HAMFI is 42.7% in 1985.
Sample: all kernels and their neighborhoods
Income of Kernel 1985 Neighborhood Median Income as % of HAMFI
as % of HAMFI 0-30% 30-50% 50-80% 80-100% 100-120% 120-150% 150-200% 200%-
0{30% 42.7 22.5 14.4 3.0 7.0 8.3 0.0 0.0
30%{50% 20.0 26.8 17.0 5.9 1.8 6.7 3.2 4.0
50%{80% 17.3 26.8 20.3 13.4 14.0 18.3 3.2 8.0
80%{100% 5.3 7.0 13.7 20.8 19.3 11.7 12.9 4.0
100%{120% 6.7 7.0 11.1 13.4 17.5 10.0 9.7 4.0
120%{150% 0.0 4.2 9.8 16.8 15.8 15.0 12.9 4.0
150%{200% 5.3 2.8 5.9 17.8 15.8 15.0 32.3 12.0
200%{ 2.7 2.8 7.8 7.9 8.8 15.0 25.8 64.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Income of Kernel 1993 Neighborhood Median Income as % of HAMFI
as % of HAMFI 0-30% 30-50% 50-80% 80-100% 100-120% 120-150% 150-200% 200%-
0{30% 50.5 25.4 14.5 7.0 7.0 9.9 5.3 5.0
30%{50% 17.5 22.3 12.2 12.5 6.0 4.2 5.3 5.0
50%{80% 17.5 20.8 26.6 12.5 8.0 11.3 7.9 10.0
80%{100% 6.8 15.4 11.7 18.0 11.0 15.5 13.2 0.0
100%{120% 2.9 10.0 7.9 16.4 15.0 9.9 5.3 0.0
120%{150% 1.0 1.5 9.8 17.2 19.0 9.9 13.2 10.0
150%{200% 1.9 1.5 9.8 10.9 20.0 22.5 15.8 10.0
200%{ 12.8 3.1 7.5 5.5 14.0 16.9 34.2 60.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
69Table A.7:
Neighborhood Income Distribution Measures, All Kernels and Neighborhoods
This table shows the distribution of speci¯ed measures for neighborhoods according to kernel
household income relative to HAMFI. The speci¯ed measures are: the minimum income of all
neighbors, the 25%-tile (meaning, the value which de¯nes the bottom 25% of incomes within the
neighborhood, referred to in the table as Q25), the median, the 75%-tile (meaning, the value which
de¯nes the top 25% of incomes within the neighborhood, referred to in the table as Q75), and the
maximum income of all neighbors. For example, column 1 shows that the minimum income in a
neighborhood will fall within 0-30% of HAMFI with probability 66.1% in 1985, it will fall within
30-50% with probability 18.0%, and so on.
Year 1985 1993
Neighborhood Measure Neighborhood Distribution Statistic Neighborhood Distribution Statistic
as % of HAMFI Min Q25 Median Q75 Max Min Q25 Median Q75 Max
0{30% 66.1 31.1 13.1 5.1 1.4 68.5 31.5 12.8 5.2 2.4
30%{50% 18.0 21.6 12.4 7.0 3.5 19.5 27.4 16.2 6.7 2.1
50%{80% 11.9 25.8 26.7 16.6 6.1 8.2 24.0 26.6 18.0 8.3
80%{100% 2.3 10.5 17.6 13.4 8.4 1.7 8.5 15.9 12.1 6.1
100%{120% 0.0 3.8 9.9 15.5 8.2 1.1 4.4 12.4 14.9 9.6
120%{150% 1.6 4.0 10.5 14.8 14.0 0.9 2.6 8.8 18.9 14.9
150%{200% 0.0 3.0 5.4 16.6 22.0 0.0 1.4 4.7 15.1 24.1
200%{ 0.0 0.0 4.4 11.0 36.5 0.0 0.4 2.5 9.1 32.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
70Table A.8:
Kernels in Neighborhoods with Low Incomes (Median Less than 80% HAMFI)
Table reports the probability that a kernel household with selected household and/or dwelling
structure characteristics will live in a neighborhood with extremely low and low incomes (median
neighborhood income less than 80% of HUD-Adjusted Median Family Income for the metropolitan
area).
In the left margin, relative income categories are de¯ned in terms of kernel household income
as percentage of HUD-Adjusted Area Median Family Income. Column 1 reports percentiles for
each of those income categories in the entire population of kernels, for 1985 and 1993, respectively.
Column 2 reports the percentage of kernels in each income category who live in neighborhoods
where the poorest one-half of residents have incomes less than 80% of HAMFI. Columns 3{5 give
the probabilities that a kernel household with speci¯ed characteristics and with income in the
respective category lives in a neighborhood with speci¯ed characteristics. Speci¯cally, the ¯rst
row of Column 3 gives the probability that a kernel household with extremely low income (less
than 30% of HAMFI) who is a subsidized renter lives in a neighborhood where the poorest one-
half of residents have incomes less than 80% of HAMFI; successive rows report the probability of
such households with very low income (30%{50% of HAMFI), low income, etc. Column 4 gives
the probability that a kernel household who is unsubsidized renter and has extremely low income
(less than 30% of HAMFI), very low income (30%{50% of HAMFI), etc., lives in a neighborhood
where at least the richest one-half of residents have incomes above 120% of HAMFI. Column 5
gives the probability that a kernel household who is an owner with extremely low income (less
than 30% of HAMFI), with very low income ((30%{50%) of HAMFI), etc., lives in a neighborhood
where the poorest one-half of residents have incomes less than 80% of HAMFI. Column 6 gives the
probability that a kernel household lives in a single-unit structure with extremely low income (less
than 30% of HAMFI), with very low income ((30%{50%) of HAMFI), etc., and in a neighborhood
where the poorest one-half of residents have incomes less than 80% of HAMFI. Column 7 gives
the probability that a kernel household who lives in a structure with least 2 but less than 19 units
and has extremely low income (less than 30% of HAMFI), very low income (30%{50% of HAMFI),
etc., lives in a neighborhood where the poorest one-half of residents have incomes less than 80% of
HAMFI. Column 8 gives the probability that a kernel household who lives in a structure with least
20 units and has extremely low income (less than 30% of HAMFI), very low income (30%{50% of
HAMFI), etc., lives in a neighborhood where the poorest one-half of residents have incomes less
than 80% of HAMFI.
7172Year 1985
% Kernels in Neighborhoods with Median <80% HAMFI
Population Kernels Kernel Tenure Kernel Structure
Relative Distribution All Sub/d Unsub/d Owner Single 2{19 20+
Income of Kernels Renter Renter Fam. Units Units
% of HAMFI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0{30% 14.3 85.4 100.0 80.0 77.7 80.5 85.7 100.0
30%{50% 12.7 86.2 100.0 85.7 77.8 77.5 85.2 100.0
50%{80% 17.3 63.6 100.0 82.2 35.1 46.6 90.3 87.5
80%{100% 12.9 39.6 69.2 25.0 32.8 71.4 50.0
100%{120% 10.6 44.3 100.0 81.9 34.7 36.2 55.6 100.0
120%{150% 10.1 31.0 57.1 22.7 25.0 57.1 66.7*
150%{200% 11.2 23.4 38.9 17.4 18.4 38.5 50.0
¤
200%{ 10.8 25.8 63.7 13.3 16.7 71.4 23.1
kernels in category as % of all 100 52.2 100.0 73.7 36.4 39.6 76.9 82.0
kernel frequency in category 100 100 5.2 33.2 61.5 76.4 25.0 7.7
Number of kernels 573 299 30 190 352 386 143 44
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